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Abstract
This paper studies the e↵ect of firm and country reputation on exports when buyers
cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand is determined by expected
quality, which is driven by the dynamics of consumer learning through experience and the
country of origin’s reputation for quality. We show that asymmetric information can result
in multiple steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. We identify two types of
steady states: a high-quality equilibrium (HQE) and a low-quality equilibrium (LQE).
In a LQE, only the lowest-quality and the highest-quality firms are active; a range of
relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the informational
friction. Countries with bad quality reputation can therefore be locked into exporting
low-quality, low-cost goods. Our model delivers novel insights about the dynamic impact
of trade policies. First, an export subsidy increases the steady-state average quality of
exports and welfare in a LQE, but decreases both quality and welfare in a HQE. Second,
there is a tax/subsidy scheme based on the duration of export experience that replicates
the perfect information outcome. Third, a large reputation shock is self-fulfilling when
the economy has multiple steady states. Finally, a minimum quality standard can help an
economy initially in a LQE moving to a HQE, but is not necessarily welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
Why are consumers willing to pay more for indistinguishable “Made in Germany” than “Made
in China” products? In which way is building a solid reputation for reliability and quality key
to a developing country’s economic success – and how can it be achieved? Conversely, can a
history of exporting cheap low-quality goods be an obstacle per se to national development
strategies aimed at upgrading quality over time? These questions find no clear answers in
standard models of international trade, which assume that consumers are perfectly informed
about the characteristics of every available product and leave no role for country reputations.
However, as a large literature on experience goods has shown, starting with Nelson (1970),
quality is not fully known to consumers prior to purchase for a wide range of goods. Inferring
the quality of a good on o↵er requires time and is achieved both through search and through
experience. For these categories of goods, country-of-origin a↵ects product evaluations and
consumers’ decisions. Indeed, many survey-based studies in the marketing literature, sum-
marized by Roth and Diamantopoulos (2009), emphasize the role of country-of-origin labels
in setting consumer perceptions of quality.
In this paper, we argue that a “national brand image” matters because it provides an
anchor for the expected unobservable quality of imports. Consumption decisions, in prac-
tice, are based on a limited information set about the characteristics of goods or varieties.
To understand the determinants of demand faced by entrants as well as incumbents in an
industry, we need to consider the information available to consumers at the time of purchase:
information gathered as a result of past consumption experience and word-of-mouth di↵usion,
but also the country where the good was manufactured. Together, these elements determine
perceived quality, which a↵ects consumption more than true quality when the latter is not
observable. Specifically, for new and unknown foreign goods, the main piece of information
available to consumers is the “made in” label, which indicates the country of manufacturing
and creates a key role for national reputations. We call “national reputation” the common
component of consumers’ perceptions of the quality of goods produced within a given country.
Usual examples of such priors are the widespread perceptions that “German goods last a life-
time” or “Chinese goods break down quickly”.1 Country reputations determine the quality
that buyers expect from a product before they learn any information specific to this variety.
In the long-run, reputations should adjust to the actual average quality of exported goods.
Broadly speaking, we are addressing three main questions. First, how does a poor “na-
tional brand” act as a barrier to entry into foreign markets, and how do the dynamics of
consumer learning and country of origin reputation interact over time? Second, under which
conditions do quality expectations have self-fulfilling e↵ects, keeping some exporting coun-
1Schott (2008) documents that the prices that US consumers are willing to pay for Chinese exports are
substantially lower than the prices they are willing to pay for OECD exports in the same product category.
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tries into low-quality traps? Finally, which policy instruments can help countries overcome
the adverse impact of such information asymmetries?
More specifically, we consider an infinite-horizon two-country model with a continuum
of potential foreign exporters heterogeneous in quality, and a constant flow of new potential
exporters per period. Each new firm draws a quality parameter from a fixed distribution
of firm technologies and has the option to produce a good of this quality. The decision to
produce is endogenous: potential foreign exporters decide whether to enter the market and
when to exit, taking into account the impact of their decisions on expected future sales. We
assume that the cost of producing one physical unit of the good is monotonically increasing
in quality, but the cost per quality-adjusted unit is decreasing in quality. Quality is known
to firms but not observed by consumers before purchase. Hence, import demand depends on
perceived quality, which has two components. Goods imported from a given country are first
evaluated according to a country-wide prior, which is determined by the average quality of
the country’s exports in a long-run industry equilibrium. Importers then learn about the true
quality of firms that have exported in the past. The fraction of informed consumers increases
with the time a firm has been active on the market. The e↵ect of the country prior will thus
prevail for new exporters and fade over time as buyers gain familiarity with individual foreign
brands.
We obtain four main results about the equilibrium structure (see Section 2 for a detailed
comparison with the literature). First, asymmetric information results in multiple steady-
state equilibria with endogenous reputation. Second, there are two types of steady states:
a high-quality, high-reputation equilibrium (HQE), and a low-quality, low-reputation equi-
librium (LQE). Third, in a LQE, only the lowest-quality and the highest-quality firms are
active; a range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the
informational friction. Finally, there can be multiple equilibria, such that countries with bad
quality reputation can be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost goods.
Our main channel is a distortion in entry and sales due to unobservable quality. Asym-
metric information fosters entry by low-quality firms, which earn higher profits than under
perfect information by free-riding on high-quality expectations. It depresses profits of the
highest-quality firms, forced to incur initial losses in order to reveal information about their
type. The combination of fly-by-night export strategies with long-term high-quality strategies
results in two types of equilibria with endogenous reputation. In a HQE, imperfect informa-
tion does not hinder entry of high-quality firms into export markets but generates excess entry
by low-quality firms. In a LQE, a range of firms with above-average quality choose never to
be active. With costs too high to allow for positive profits in the first periods, and quality
too low for initial losses to be recouped with future profits, they do not find it profitable to
enter the market.
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We consider various policies that can be implemented by a government to help a country
locked in a bad equilibrium. Imperfect information about the quality of imported goods
provides a justification for export promotion policies in economies specialized in low-quality
products. Some export-led growth strategies for developing countries, pursued in the past by
East Asian economies, rely on exporting low-quality, low-cost goods and gradually moving
up to higher quality, higher unit value goods. China is attempting to follow the same path.
Without policy intervention, though, we show that it may not be feasible if the economy is
trapped in a self-fulfilling low equilibrium, in which the country’s reputation for low quality
prevents high-quality firms from entering export markets. A successful export promotion
policy then involves either subsidizing exporters’ initial losses, or investing public resources
into raising the country’s perception abroad.
Our model delivers novel insights about the impact of the following trade policies. First,
an export subsidy increases the steady-state average quality of exports and welfare of the
exporting country in a LQE, but decreases both quality and welfare in a HQE. A permanent
export subsidy raises the incentives to export for all firms, but in a LQE it has a larger e↵ect
on high-quality firms which have a longer e↵ective horizon. Conversely, in a HQE, it only leads
to additional entry by low-quality firms, which creates a negative reputation externality on all
exporters. Second, there is a tax/subsidy scheme based on the duration of export experience
that replicates the perfect information outcome. Third, a small reputation shock only has
short-lived e↵ects, but a large reputation shock is self-fulfilling when the economy has multiple
steady-states. Large positive reputation shocks raise prices received by all firms and allow
more firms with above-average quality to enter, thereby driving up the true average quality of
exported goods both in the short-run and in the long-run. Negative reputation shocks have
the opposite e↵ects: there can be long-term negative consequences of a sudden large drop in
reputation, e.g. large product recalls or heavily mediatized consumer safety scandals. Finally,
a minimum quality standard can help an economy initially in a LQE moving to a HQE, but
is not necessarily welfare improving.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relevant
to the present study and shows how our approach leads to new insights. Section 3 lays out our
modelling framework. Section 4 analyzes high-quality and low-quality steady-state equilibria
with endogenous reputation. Section 5 explores the e↵ects of di↵erent policy instruments
on quality, reputation and profits. Finally, Section 6 presents additional predictions of our
dynamic framework. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Relationship to the Literature
Our paper relates to the international trade and industrial organization literature on vertical
quality di↵erentiation and asymmetric information. This section briefly explains how our
dynamic approach with a continuum of quality types di↵ers from the existing models that
consider the e↵ects of asymmetric information on exports.
Informational barriers to entry in international trade have been studied by Mayer (1984),
Grossman and Horn (1988), Bagwell and Staiger (1989), Bagwell (1991), Chen (1991), Das-
gupta and Mondria (2012) and Chisik (2003). Mayer (1984) was the first to investigate export
subsidies in the presence of initially uninformed consumers but did so without modeling explic-
itly the process of consumer learning and expectations formation, and relied on pessimistic
consumer beliefs. Dasgupta and Mondria (2012) develop a two-period model with similar
features to ours, where the quality of new exporters is unobservable and that of continuing
exporters is known by a fraction of consumers. They, however, focus on the role of intermedi-
aries in providing quality assurance and do not analyze the formation of country reputations.
We take the analysis further by endogenizing country reputations in an infinite-horizon setting
and characterizing steady-state equilibria.
The articles that are the most closely related to the present paper are Bagwell and Staiger
(1989) and Chisik (2003) who both explore the interplay between country reputation, export-
ing firm quality and optimal trade policy. While our paper builds on these pioneering works, it
departs from them both in the assumptions and in the policy implications. First, most of the
existing literature stresses the importance of exporters signaling strategy about their quality
(either through prices, capacity, or via some other signaling device). While we recognize that
signaling issues are important, we choose to abstract from them in order to focus on other
e↵ects. In our model, exporting firms have no way to signal their quality, so that information
acquisition is entirely driven by the dynamics of consumer learning through experience and
country reputation e↵ects. This allows us to introduce a richer quality structure (we have a
continuum of quality types, while both Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Chisik (2003) have
only two types) and time structure (we have an infinite horizon model, while Bagwell and
Staiger (1989) use a two-period model and Chisik (2003) considers a static game). We are
then able to model the process of reputation formation and investigate the transition dynam-
ics of reputation between steady states, between an uninformed prior and the steady state,
or following shocks.
Most importantly, these di↵erences in assumptions allow us to develop novel insights about
the dynamic interplay between entry and exit of firms, trade patterns, country reputations
and trade policies. First, compared to the existing literature, we obtain two regimes (HQE
and LQE). Second, in the LQE regime, the non-exporters are in the middle of the quality
distribution, while the lowest-quality firms and the highest-quality firms are not precluded
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from entering the market. To the extent of our knowledge, our paper is the first to obtain
these results. In Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and in Chisik (2003), there are only two types of
firms, so by construction there cannot be the hollowing out of the middle that we obtain.
Furthermore, our model delivers novel insights about the dynamic impact of trade policies.
In Chisik (2003), export subsidies are of no use because they do not alter the relative payo↵s
of high-quality and low-quality firms. In our model, high-quality firms face a longer e↵ective
time horizon, so that even a subsidy granted indiscriminately to all exporters tilts the incentive
to export in favor of high-quality firms. In Bagwell and Staiger (1989), an export subsidy can
improve welfare. A subsidy can induce high-quality firms to enter the export market, while
absent the subsidy their entry may be blocked by their inability to sell at prices reflecting
their true quality. We also obtain a positive e↵ect of an export subsidy in our paper in the
LQE case, but with an important di↵erence: in our model, very high-quality firms export
even absent the subsidy; the subsidy induces middle-quality firms to export, and the overall
e↵ect on average quality is positive. Grossman and Horn (1988) point the fragility of the
policy advice in Bagwell and Staiger (1989) where quality is exogenous, like in our paper.
They argue that when quality is endogenous, an export subsidy does encourage entry but
the marginal entrants are the ones with the greatest incentive to produce low-quality goods,
reducing average quality (see Grossman, 1989). However, our model encompasses both e↵ects.
While a permanent subsidy does worsen the socially excessive entry of low-quality firms in a
HQE, it also alleviates the problem of socially insu cient entry of high-quality firms.2 In the
HQE case, our paper yields a similar result to Grossman and Horn (1988): an export subsidy
is detrimental to average quality as it promotes entry of low-quality firms while it does not
change the incentives and decisions of high-quality firms.
Next, our new framework allows us to analyze the e↵ect of other trade policies, some
of which have been overlooked in the literature. According to Chisik (2003), the correct
policy response involves direct investment in education or research and development that can
indirectly subsidize high-quality firms, or a quality stamp. In our model, we show that if
the government can observe how many periods a firm has been in the market, it can design
a tax and subsidy program that similarly changes the relative incentives of high-quality and
low-quality firms and improves both quality and reputation. Alternatively, we show that a
minimum quality standard can help move to a more favorable equilibrium, but may not be
optimal for the exporting country.
Finally, our paper relates to the several early papers (Shapiro, 1983; Riordan, 1986; Farrell,
1986; Liebeskind and Rumelt, 1989) that have studied entry and pricing strategies for experi-
ence goods in a closed economy framework. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996, 2006) incorporate
2This would still be the case if we allowed for an endogenous quality choice, although fly-by-night firms
would then always choose the minimum quality level.
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the experimentation and learning processes by consumers. We develop these insights further
by considering the demand for imports, where initial priors depend on country-of-origin, and
reputations are built not only for specific firms but also for exporting countries as a whole.
It also relates to the industrial organization literature on labels and quality certification, a
strand of it assuming that quality is unknown to consumers (see e.g. Perrot and Linnemer,
2000). This literature focuses on the signaling role of labels: labels act as quality signals for
individual firms which seek to signal quality and build consumer trust (see e.g. Grossman,
1981; Klein and Le✏er, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Lizzeri, 1999), but there are no
reputation externalities between firms. Lastly, Tirole (1996) models group reputation as both
the outcome and a determinant of individual behavior in a moral hazard setting. His model
generates a high- and a low-reputation steady-state equilibrium, but for given initial condi-
tions, there is a unique equilibrium. An interesting result is that a one-time shock can have
permanent e↵ects on collective reputation. In this article, we abstract from moral hazard
issues but we show that adverse selection can also generate long-run e↵ects of temporary rep-
utation shocks, and we provide a richer equilibrium structure including multiple self-fulfilling
equilibria.
3 Model Set-Up
We develop a model with two countries, Home and Foreign. We focus on the industry equilib-
rium in an export-oriented sector in Home, for which Foreign is the importer. In Home, there
is a continuum of potential exporters j of mass 1 being born every period. In Foreign, there
is a pool of importers indexed by i, each of which demands one unit of the good. Potential
demand for imported goods in Foreign is assumed to be large. We do not model explicitly
the domestic market of foreign firms: all firms in the industry produce for export only.3
3.1 Firms
Each new potential exporter draws a quality parameter ✓ from a Pareto distribution G (✓)
with support on [✓m,1) and shape parameter ↵ > 1:
G (✓) ⌘ 1 
✓
✓m
✓
◆↵
(1)
We note µ0 the unconditional expectation of quality draws: µ0 ⌘ ↵↵ 1✓m.
3Or, equivalently, markets are segmented. We could easily extend the model to allow firms to serve their
domestic market as long as the decisions to enter the domestic and export markets are separable. The key
assumption is that there is no information flowing between buyers located in di↵erent geographic markets. In
particular, a firm having established a reputation in its domestic market would not be able to transfer this
reputation to export sales.
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Each new firm j has the option to produce a good of quality level ✓ (j).4 At the beginning
of every period, firms decide whether to stay active and export, or shut down. Each firm has
capacity 1, so that it can choose to sell either one unit or nothing.
If it produces and sells, a firm j of type ✓ (j) incurs a cost w✓ (j) + k, including both
production and transport costs (with k > 0 and 0 < w < 1). k includes all costs that are
independent of quality, while w✓ (j) is the portion of costs that increases with the quality
of the product (e.g. quality control processes, better intermediate inputs, or more skilled
workers). Hence, profits at period t+ s of an active firm j born at date t are:
⇡t+s (j) = pt+s (j)  w✓ (j)  k (2)
where pt+s (j) is the price at which firm j sells its output. The price-setting mechanism is
described in the next subsection.
A firm can freely exit at any period and realize zero profits from this period onwards.
However if it chooses to exit the export market in a given period, it cannot re-enter later.5
Moreover, each firm has an exogenous probability (1   ) of su↵ering from a bad shock that
forces it to exit every period, independent of both quality and the firm’s age. The probability
that a firm still exists from one period to the next, conditional on not choosing to exit, is  .
The exogenous “exit shock” acts as a discount rate, as in Melitz (2003). There is no additional
discount rate.
3.2 Buyers
In Foreign, each potential importer demands one unit of the good. Potential demand for im-
ported goods is assumed to be large, in the sense that the market size is su cient for all Home
exporters to find a buyer at a price that does not exceed the expected value of their goods.
The true utility from consuming a good of quality level ✓ is ✓ but is not observable before
purchase. We can think of ✓ as characteristics that are observed only upon consumption, or
for durable goods, as the inverse of the probability of breakdown per period.
At the beginning of every period, each active firm j is randomly matched to a buyer i in
Foreign. The firm cannot sell to another importer in that period, nor can the buyer purchase
from another exporter before the next period. The firm then sets the price equal to the
expected value of the good for its buyer. The indirect utility buyer i receives from the good
sold by firm j at time t+ s is:
4For simplicity we do not model the choice of quality. We can think of the exogenous quality draw as
determined on the domestic market before considering the decision to export, or as a technology blueprint
which comes from an R&D process with uncertain outcome: all firms invest the same sunk cost in R&D and
randomly, some come up with better quality products than others.
5This assumption is inconsequential for the steady-state analysis. It rules out coordination problems among
high-quality firms along the transition path.
8
uit+s (j) = ✓ (j)  pt+s (j) (3)
which can be derived from an additively separable utility function where buyer i consumes a
numeraire good and one unit of the imported di↵erentiated good. As ✓ (j) is not observed,
the maximum price that an importer i is willing to pay for the output of firm j at time t+ s
is given by its expected quality from the perspective of the buyer:
pt+s (j) = E
i
t+s
⇥
✓ (j) |Iit+s
⇤
(4)
where Iit+s is the information set of buyer i at time t+ s. We assume that firms hold all the
bargaining power and receive the full expected surplus of the transaction.6
There are two types of buyers, informed and uninformed. Uninformed buyers have no
information specific to firm j: they do not know its quality or how long it has been an
active exporter. The only information at their disposal is the “national reputation”, i.e. a
prior µt+s about expected quality among all foreign exporters. µt+s is common across buyers
and is endogenized in Section 4. Informed buyers know the true quality of firm j, either
because they have past experience from consumption of good j or because they have received
information from another importer who has. The price received by firm j matched with buyer
i in period t+s is therefore equal to its quality if i is informed, and to the country’s reputation
if i is uninformed. Equation (4) can thus be rewritten as:
pt+s (j) =
(
µt+s if i is uninformed.
✓ (j) if i is informed.
(5)
In the first period when a firm j enters the market, all importers are uninformed about
j. Then, if firm j has exported s times in the past, a fraction ⇢ (s) of buyers are informed,
where we make the following natural assumption:
Assumption 1 ⇢0   0, ⇢ (0) = 0, and lim
s!1 ⇢ (s) = 1.
The fraction of informed buyers increases as the firm gains export experience.7 A possible
microfoundation for the ⇢ (s) function is that importers belong to distinct groups within
which information di↵usion takes place. The fraction of informed buyers rises according
6Long-term contracts between exporters and importers are ruled out in this setting: all contracts are one-
period sales contracts and firms are matched to customers for one period only. In particular, there cannot
be price schedules resembling an introductory pricing strategy, whereby buyers would pay a low price in the
initial period and o↵er a sequence of prices contingent on their future consumption experience.
7Note that a concave ⇢ (s) would capture the idea that a firm having already exported is more likely to
be matched again with one of its previous buyers or with someone close to a previous buyer in terms of
informational di↵usion. Hence the rate at which the scope of informed buyers expands would decrease with
the number of periods the firm has been on the market. However, the only conditions needed for our analysis
is that ⇢ is monotonically increasing and takes values between 0 and 1.
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to the probability of sampling a buyer from an uninformed versus an informed group (See
Appendix B for a formal development).
For expositional simplicity we drop the j notation in the next sections and refer to “firm
✓” instead of “firm j with quality parameter ✓” whenever possible.
3.3 Timing
For a given cohort of firms born at date t, the timing of moves proceeds as follows:
• At t, each new firm draws a parameter ✓ and decides whether to export or not.
• For each s   1, at time t+ s:
– Each active firm is matched with a buyer and observes whether the buyer is in-
formed.
– The price is set at Et+s [✓|It+s], and production and sales take place.
– For each good that was sold, the fraction of informed buyers rises from ⇢ (s) to
⇢ (s+ 1).
– With probability (1   ), each firm is forced to exit by a bad shock.
– Firms that survive decide whether to stay active.
– New firms are born (cohort t+ s).
3.4 Perfect Information
Under perfect information, all ✓ are observable by all parties. All firms receive a price p⇤t+s
equal to true quality regardless of how long they have been exporting: p⇤t+s (✓) = ✓ for all s.
Therefore, it follows from (2) that firms are active exporters if and only if ✓   ✓⇤, where
the perfect information threshold is defined as:
✓⇤ ⌘ k
1  w (6)
Under perfect information, the model therefore predicts a sorting of firms into non-
exporters and exporters similar to that of Melitz (2003). We can define productivity as
the inverse of the cost per unit of quality w+ k✓ . The firms with the highest quality ✓ are also
those with the highest productivity. Firms above the quality threshold ✓⇤, or equivalently
below the quality-adjusted cost threshold w + k✓⇤ , always export and never exit voluntarily,
while firms below the threshold never export.
The perfect information threshold is key for our analysis because, under asymmetric in-
formation, per-period profits converge over time towards their perfect information value (see
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Section 3.5 below). Moreover, from a global welfare point of view, it is not optimal for firms
with quality below the perfect information threshold ✓⇤ to enter export markets – in this case,
the value of the output to consumers is lower than the opportunity cost of production. How-
ever, given that exporters set their price equal to the expected value of the good for the buyers
and receive the full expected surplus of the transaction, it can be profitable for firms with
quality below the perfect information threshold ✓⇤ to enter the export market temporarily
under asymmetric information, increasing welfare in Home but hurting total welfare.
3.5 Imperfect Information: Price and Profits
Under asymmetric information, suppose µt is the buyers’ prior about the expected quality of
a good from the foreign country at time t. This prior is the national reputation or “national
brand” and is taken as exogenous by individual firms, although it is endogenous at the country
level. We derive its equilibrium value in Section 4, as a function of the quality distribution
of exports. The price o↵ered to a firm born at date t is either the country-wide prior if the
buyer is uninformed, or its true quality if the buyer is informed. The probability of receiving
a price which reflects the firms’ true quality increases with the firm’s export experience. In
the first period in which a firm is active, no buyer has any information specific to the firm, so
that the price only depends on the prior:
pt+1 = µt+1 (7)
Then in the following periods, conditional on the firm still being active, the pricing equa-
tion (5) implies that the price received by the firm is set according to the following rule:
pt+s =
(
✓ with probability ⇢ (s  1)
µt+s with probability 1  ⇢ (s  1)
for s   1 (8)
where ⇢ (s  1) is the fraction of informed buyers for a firm that has previously exported
(s  1) times. In particular, a firm that exports for the first time faces only uninformed
importers (⇢ (0) = 0). As lims!1 ⇢ (s) = 1, the expectation of the price converges to the
perfect information price ✓ over time if the firm stays in the market indefinitely.
The expected profits of the firm in future periods, conditional on remaining active, are
the di↵erence between its expected price and its production cost:
Et⇡t+s = (⇢ (s  1)  w) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (s  1))Etµt+s   k (9)
Expected profits place a larger weight on true quality and a smaller weight on national
reputation as the firm gains tenure into exporting. It immediately follows that if reputation is
time-invariant, which will be the case in a steady-state equilibrium, a firm with quality above
11
the country prior (✓ > µ) expects to realize an increasing sequence of profits over time, while
a firm with quality below the country prior (✓ < µ) expects decreasing profits. For all active
firms, if µ is constant, the price is monotonically converging towards ✓ and per-period profits
are monotonically converging towards their perfect information value (1  w) ✓   k.
To ensure that expected profits from repeat purchases – as opposed to initial purchases –
are increasing in true quality, we assume that the updating parameter is large enough relative
to the cost of producing quality:
Assumption 2 ⇢ (1) > w
In each period t, a firm of quality ✓ having exported s times in the past stays active if the
expected present value of doing so, PVt (✓, s), is positive. The firm is free to exit at any future
date. Let T (✓) be the exit date (possibly infinity) that maximizes the firm’s intertemporal
problem. Then PVt (✓, s) is the discounted sum of current and future profits in (9) up to the
optimal exit date:
PVt (✓, s) =
T (✓)X
u=0
 u [(⇢ (s+ u)  w) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (s+ u))Etµt+u   k] (10)
where Etµt+u = µt+u for all u since there is no aggregate uncertainty. The optimal exit dates
and endogenous reputations are derived in the next section.
4 Industry Equilibrium
In this section, we define a steady-state industry equilibrium as one in which national reputa-
tion is pinned down by the average quality of a country’s exports and the quality distribution
is stationary. We characterize the entry and exit patterns in high-quality and low-quality
steady-state equilibria and lay out their existence conditions.
4.1 Equilibrium Definition
Country reputations are taken as exogenous by individual firms. In each period t, letMt (✓, s)
be the number of active firms of quality ✓ having previously exported s times. Let Nt (✓) =
tP
s=0
Mt (✓, s) be the total number of active firms of quality ✓. We derive ✓t as the average
quality of exports across quality levels and cohorts of firms:
✓t =
R1
✓m
✓Nt (✓) d✓R1
✓m
Nt (✓) d✓
(11)
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We assume that country reputations evolve according to the actual quality of exported
goods in the previous period:8
µt+1 = µt + ⌘
 
✓t   µt
 
(12)
where ⌘ < 1 and ✓t is the average quality of foreign firms’ exports at period t. Reputation
rises (respectively, falls) from one period to the next if the average quality of exported goods
in the previous period was higher (respectively, lower) than expected. Setting ⌘ < 1 captures
the slow-moving aspect of reputations and only matters for equilibrium stability. Along with
✓t, this determines µt+1 according to (11).
A new firm of quality ✓ is active at t + 1 if PVt+1 (✓, 0) > 0, i.e. if its expected present
value of doing so is positive. Hence the number of active new firms per quality level is:
Mt+1 (✓, 0) =
(
g (✓) if PVt+1 (✓, 0) > 0
0 if PVt+1 (✓, 0)  0
(13)
Among incumbent firms of quality ✓ having exported s times,  Mt (✓, s  1) survive from
period t to period t + 1. They remain active if PVt+1 (✓, s) > 0 in equation (10). Thus the
number of active old firms is, for s   1:
Mt+1 (✓, s) =
(
 Mt (✓, s  1) if PVt+1 (✓, s) > 0
0 if PVt+1 (✓, 0)  0
(14)
Equations (11), (12), (13) and (14) determine ✓t+1 and µt+2. We can then define the
industry steady-state as an equilibrium with constant reputation and a constant distribution
of quality.
Definition 1 (Steady-State Equilibrium)n
µ, {M (✓, s)}s,✓
o
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if:
(i) For all ✓ 2 [✓m,1) and all s   0, if Mt (✓, s) =M (✓, s) and Etµt+u = µ for all u   0,
then Mt+1 (✓, s) =M (✓, s) in (13) and (14);
(ii) If Mt (✓, s) =M (✓, s) for all ✓ 2 [✓m,1) and all s   0, then ✓t = µ in (11).
Condition (i) ensures that the number of firms in each quality-age segment is constant in
the steady state. Condition (ii) states that the average quality resulting from an equilibrium
distribution of active firms is equal to the equilibrium country reputation. It guarantees that
µ is constant in a steady state. In other words, a steady state with national reputation µ
8This equation is a reduced form for consumers’ updating process, where the implied simplifying assumption
is that ⌘ – which captures the speed at which beliefs are updated – is constant. We adopt this simple rule-of-
thumb formulation for beliefs updating rather than modeling explicitly the Bayesian updating process for the
sake of simplicity. This hypothesis is not necessary for our main steady-state results, and policy implications
and only ensures that equilibrium stability holds under general conditions.
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is a rational expectations equilibrium if the average quality of active exporters is equal to
buyers’ quality expectation. The endogenous entry and exit decisions induced by µ justify
the reputation ex post.
4.2 Equilibrium Steady-State Reputation
Let ✓ (µ) be the average quality of exports as a function of constant beliefs µ. An equilibrium
steady-state reputation is a time-invariant reputation µ such that ✓ (µ) = µ.
To compute the fixed point(s) of ✓ (µ) (if any), we proceed as follows. First, we characterize
firms’ entry and exit decision. Second, we compute Mt (✓, s), i.e. the number of active firms
of quality ✓ having previously exported s times, and thus the average quality of exports as a
function of µ. We then derive the existence conditions for each type of equilibrium.
4.2.1 Sorting of Firms into Non Exporters and Exporters
Our analysis distinguishes between two types of equilibria. A “high-quality equilibrium”
(HQE) is a steady-state equilibrium where the country reputation µ exceeds the perfect infor-
mation quality threshold ✓⇤. A “low-quality equilibrium” (LQE) is a steady-state equilibrium
where the country reputation falls short of the perfect information quality threshold ✓⇤. For-
mally:
Definition 2 (HQE & LQE)n
µ, {M (✓, s)}s,✓
o
is a high-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ > ✓⇤ and
n
µ, {M (✓, s)}s,✓
o
is a steady-state equilibrium according to Definition 1.
n
µ, {M (✓, s)}s,✓
o
is a low-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ < ✓⇤ and
n
µ, {M (✓, s)}s,✓
o
is a steady-state equilibrium according to Definition 1.
The two regimes have di↵erent entry and exit patterns, due to the impact of asymmetric
information and the dynamics of consumer learning. Compared to the perfect information
case, the unobservability of quality initially fosters entry by low-quality firms but depresses
profits of the highest-quality firms. In a HQE, a firm with quality equal to the country’s
reputation would be viable in a perfect information setting. All firms receive high prices
as they enter the market, which encourages entry. Therefore, imperfect information does
not hinder entry of high-quality firms into export markets but generates excess entry by low-
quality firms. On the contrary, in a LQE, a firm with quality equal to the country’s reputation
would never export in a perfect information setting. Some low-quality firms still profit by
free-riding on the country reputation, but a range of firms with above-average quality are
permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction. In other words, there is a
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hollowing out of the middle of the quality distribution. Proposition 1 establishes formally the
sorting of firms into non exporters and exporters in a HQE and in a LQE.
Proposition 1 (Sorting of Firms into Exporting: Two Regimes)
In a HQE:
1. All entrants are initially active;
2. Firms with ✓ < ✓⇤ expect to exit after T (✓) periods where T is weakly increasing in ✓;
3. Firms with ✓ > ✓⇤ stay in the market until hit by the exogenous shock.
In a LQE:
1. Firms with quality ✓ < ✓L enter the export market and exit after selling for one period,
where ✓L ⌘ µ kw < µ < ✓⇤;
2. Firms with quality ✓ > ✓H enter and stay in the market until hit by the exogenous shock,
where ✓H ⌘ k µ(1 A⇢)A⇢ w > ✓⇤ and A⇢ ⌘ (1   )
P1
s=0  
s⇢ (s) .
3. Firms with quality ✓L  ✓  ✓H never enter the market.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
Figure 1 shows the sorting of firms according to their quality parameter in each regime. In
a HQE (upper figure 1a), all low-quality firms (below ✓⇤) find it profitable to enter initially as
fly-by-nights as they have low production costs and can therefore reap positive expected profits
as long as a small enough number of buyers have information about their type. The higher
the country reputation, the higher the price they receive in the first period. However, they
become less profitable as consumers gain information about their quality through consumption
experience. Low-quality firms thus face a decreasing sequence of expected profits converging to
a negative value; they will eventually see their expected present value of profits turn negative
and exit. The lowest-quality firms exit first, and ✓T is the highest quality type that exits after
selling for T periods – or the lowest quality type that exits after selling for T + 1 periods.9
For high-quality firms (above ✓⇤), it is always profitable to enter and keep exporting. Firms
between ✓⇤ and µ have expected profits declining over time, but positive in every period. Firms
above µ have expected profits increasing over time. The highest quality firms incur losses in
the initial period but recoup these losses in later periods once enough buyers have received
information about their type; their expected intertemporal profits are always positive.
9Firms below ✓⇤ exit after T (✓) periods, where T (✓) is the exit date that maximizes the firm’s intertemporal
profit (see equation (10)). We can derive ✓T = max
n
k [1 ⇢(T )]µ
⇢(T ) w , ✓m
o
for T   1 and limT!1 ✓T = ✓⇤ (See
Appendix A.1).
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(a) High-Quality Equilibrium
(b) Low-Quality Equilibrium
Notes: The Figure shows the sorting of firms into exporters and non exporters by ✓ in a HQE (upper figure
1a) and in a LQE (bottom figure 1b).
Figure 1: Sorting of Firms by ✓
In a LQE (bottom figure 1b), there is a range of low-quality firms (below ✓L) that gain
from the information asymmetry and realize positive first-period profits. However they would
make losses if they were to stay active in the second period once buyers have received some
information about their quality. These firms therefore exit immediately after selling once. An
intermediate range of middle-quality firms [✓L, ✓H ] around ✓⇤ never become active exporters.
Those with ✓L < ✓ < ✓⇤ have negative expected profits at all periods, while those with
✓⇤ < ✓ < ✓H would be profitable in the long run once enough buyers have gathered
information about their type. However, for the latter, the present value of their profit stream
is negative: losses incurred in the initial periods in order to establish a reputation are not
made up for with later expected profits. Hence this range of firms is kept out of export
markets by the information asymmetry and the cost of revealing quality. Finally, high-quality
firms (above ✓H) are not profitable in the first period when they enter the export market
(their quality is higher than the country reputation µ). They nevertheless choose to enter
given that their present value of expected profits is positive: expected profits from sales in
later periods, when a larger portion of the price reflects true quality, exceed initial losses. The
negative profits in their first export periods can be interpreted as investments in building a
firm-specific brand name.
This sorting of firms into exporters and non exporters in a LQE, with non-exporters in
the middle of the quality distribution, is a new result compared to the existing literature.
In particular, the introduction of an infinite horizon and a continuum of quality types, with
group reputation endogenously determined by individual firm choices, enables us to uncover
this richer pattern compared to two-period or two-type models.
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4.2.2 Average Quality
The number M (✓, s) of active firms of quality ✓ having already exported s times is derived
from Proposition 1 and equations (13) and (14).
High-quality equilibrium In a HQE, the number M (✓, s) of active firms of quality ✓
having already exported s times is:
M (✓, s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 sg (✓) if ✓ < ✓⇤ and s < T (✓)
0 if ✓ < ✓⇤ and s   T (✓)
 sg (✓) if ✓   ✓⇤
(15)
so that the total number N (✓) of active firms of quality ✓ is 1  T (✓)1   g (✓) if ✓ < ✓
⇤, and
1
1  g (✓) if ✓   ✓⇤. The steady-state average quality of exports in a HQE as a function of µ
and exogenous parameters is given by equation (11) as:
✓ (µ) = µ0
0BB@1 
1P
T=0
 T+1
⇣
✓m
✓T
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓T+1⌘↵ 1 
1 
1P
T=0
 T+1
h⇣
✓m
✓T+1
⌘↵   ⇣ ✓m✓T+1⌘↵i
1CCA (16)
where ✓0 ⌘ ✓m. The average quality of active firms is higher than the mean of the uncondi-
tional distribution of ✓, as lower-quality firms exit earlier than higher-quality firms. However,
it lies below the perfect information average quality.
From (16), it follows that ✓ (µ) is continuously decreasing in µ on [✓⇤,1). In words,
starting from a reputation µ above ✓⇤, the average quality of exported goods falls when the
reputation µ increases. The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, improving national
reputation does not a↵ect the decisions of firms above ✓⇤ to stay or exit, as they are already
remaining active as long as possible. On the other hand, it encourages lower-quality firms to
stay longer: for firms below ✓⇤, a higher µ raises all T (✓), implying that low-quality firms
wait longer before exiting the market. In short, the incentives of high-quality firms are not
a↵ected but those of low-quality firms result in a higher export duration of firms producing
“bad” varieties. Hence, starting from a HQE, raising national reputation µ has a negative
e↵ect on actual quality, which ensures that a high-quality steady state is stable.
Low-quality equilibrium In a LQE, the number of active firms of quality ✓ having already
exported s times is given by:
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M (✓, s) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
g (✓) if ✓ < ✓L and s = 0
0 if ✓ < ✓L and s   1
0 if ✓L  ✓  ✓H
 sg (✓) if ✓ > ✓H
(17)
so that the total number N (✓) of active firms of quality ✓ is g (✓) if ✓ < ✓L and
1
1  g (✓)
if ✓ > ✓H . The steady-state average quality of exports in a LQE as a function of µ and
exogenous parameters is given by equation (11) as:
✓ (µ) = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ 1
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵
1CA (18)
From (17), we can show that ✓ (µ) is not necessarily monotonic over [✓m, ✓⇤]. The intuition
is as follows. Starting from a reputation µ below ✓⇤, raising µ has two consequences with
opposite e↵ects on average quality. On the one hand, increasing µ enables more firms to
realize positive profits from first-period sales: this fosters entry by firms with below-average
quality and lowers the expected quality of active firms. On the other hand, increasing µ
reduces the loss incurred by high-quality firms before they have been able to signal their
quality to buyers, allowing more firms with above-average quality to be active. The net
change in the average quality depends on the balance between these two e↵ects. As a result,
LQEs can be stable or unstable.
4.2.3 Existence Conditions
A steady-state equilibrium is a fixed point of ✓ (µ) defined by equation (18) on [✓m, ✓⇤] and by
equation (16) on [✓⇤,1). An equilibrium such that µ = ✓ (µ) < ✓⇤ is a LQE. An equilibrium
such that µ = ✓ (µ) > ✓⇤ is a HQE. Proposition 2 establishes existence conditions.
Proposition 2 (Existence Conditions)
1. There is always at least one steady-state equilibrium.
2. There is one HQE and an even number of LQE (possibly zero) if and only if ✓ (✓⇤) > ✓⇤,
i.e. if and only if:
↵
✓
✓m
✓⇤
◆
+
 
1   
✓
✓m
✓⇤
◆↵
> ↵  1 (19)
3. There is no HQE and an odd number of LQEs (at least one) if and only if ✓ (✓⇤) < ✓⇤,
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i.e. if and only if:
↵
✓
✓m
✓⇤
◆
+
 
1   
✓
✓m
✓⇤
◆↵
< ↵  1
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Hence, depending on the parameters, the rational expectations steady-state falls into
one of two regimes: a LQE or a HQE. The type of equilibrium depends on whether the
(not necessarily unique) fixed point of ✓ (µ) falls left or right of ✓⇤. Figure 2 provides a
graphical illustration. The figure represents the steady-state average quality of exports ✓ (µ)
as a function of µ (red line). The black diagonal is a 45 degree line, and we plot a vertical
dotted line at the perfect information threshold ✓⇤ (equal to 2.4 in this example). In the
upper figure 2a, we illustrate the existence of a HQE: ✓ (✓⇤) > ✓⇤ and there is one HQE, µ0S .
This equilibrium is not unique: there are also two LQEs, µS and µU . On the contrary, in the
bottom figure 2b, we illustrate the fact that when ✓ (✓⇤) < ✓⇤, there is no HQE. The only
equilibria of the economy are LQEs. In this example, there is a unique LQE, µS .
(a) HQE (b) No HQE
Notes: In subfigure 2a, the fixed parameter values are: ✓m = 1, ↵ = 2.2,   = 0.7, k = 1.2, w = 0.5. The
perfect information threshold is ✓⇤ = 2.4. The steady states of this economy are µS ⇡ 1.900, µU ⇡ 2.230 and
µ0S ⇡ 2.477. In subfigure 2b, the parameters are the same except ↵ = 2.4. The unique steady state of this
economy is µS ⇡ 1.767.
Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria
The existence condition (19) for a HQE holds for   (the probability that a firm still exists
from one period to the next) high enough, ↵ (the shape parameter of the distribution) low
enough, and/or k (the costs that are independent of quality) and w (the costs that increase
with quality) low enough. Figure 3 illustrates this existence condition. In the dark region,
condition (19) holds and there exists one HQE. In the light grey region, there is no HQE:
the steady-state of the economy is necessarily a LQE. In subfigure 3a, we fix the values of k
and w and show that there exists a HQE if ↵ is low enough and   is high enough. A high  
implies that exogenous exit is relatively less prevalent than endogenous exit, increasing the
relative mass of high-quality firms. A low ↵ means that there is high dispersion in the prior
distribution of ✓ and therefore more firms at the right tail of the distribution pushing up
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(a) (b)
Notes: Fixed parameter values in subfigure 3a: ✓m = 1, k = 1.5, w = 0.5. Fixed parameter values in subfigure
3b: ✓m = 1, k = 1.5,   = 0.95.
Figure 3: Parameter Values for the Existence of a HQE
the mean. In subfigure 3b, we fix the values of k and  . There exists one HQE if w is low
enough. Intuitively, a low w reduces the relative cost advantage of low-quality firms, as well
as the loss incurred in initial periods by high-quality firms. Similarly, a low k also reduces the
initial losses of low-quality firms and lowers the perfect information threshold ✓⇤, expanding
the existence region of a HQE.
5 Policy Implications
How can countries improve their “national brand name” – and is it worth it? First-best policies
would involve conducting verifiable quality audits or taxing low-quality firms and subsidizing
high-quality ones. These policies are not feasible when policy-makers are not better informed
than consumers about firms’ quality levels. Here, we look at the e↵ects of three main policy
instruments on reputation, quality and welfare: (i) export subsidies, (ii) export promotion
campaigns creating reputation shocks, and (iii) minimum quality standards.
5.1 Export Subsidies
Export subsidies have been used historically by a number of countries to favor their exporting
activities. For example in South Korea, public investment subsidies were tied to exporting
activity in the 1970s, as Korean governments were determined to favor the emergence of the
country on the international trade scene.10 We model an export subsidy as a permanent11
10Pack and Westphal (1986), Westphal (1990), Levy (1991), Rodrik (1995) and Aw et al. (1998) have
documented the importance of government investment subsidies in Korea.
11We are comparing the long-run industry equilibria with and without the policy. With a temporary subsidy,
if the equilibrium is unique, the economy would return to the initial steady state in the long-run after the subsidy
expires.
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unanticipated subsidy to fixed export costs, resulting in a lower e↵ective k for active exporters,
financed by non-distortionary lump-sum taxes.
Interestingly, export subsidies have opposite e↵ects in the two types of equilibria. This
di↵erence stems from the impact of the subsidy on the entry and exit patterns of high-quality
versus low-quality firms. In a LQE, an export subsidy leads to higher entry by firms in the
middle of the quality distribution. We show that the overall e↵ect on average quality, and thus
steady-state national reputation, is positive as long as   is not too low: starting from a LQE,
an export subsidy increases long-run equilibrium quality and the welfare of the exporting
country.12 On the contrary, in a HQE, an export subsidy is actually detrimental to average
quality and welfare as it discourages exit by low-quality firms. These results are summarized
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Export Subsidy)
An export subsidy in a LQE increases the steady-state average quality of exports and welfare
of the exporting country.
An export subsidy in a HQE decreases the steady-state average quality of exports and welfare
of the exporting country.
Proof: see Appendix A.3.
More specifically, in a LQE, a decrease in k induces more relatively high-quality firms to
start and continue exporting (lower ✓H) and more relatively low-quality firms to export for
one period (higher ✓L). The net e↵ect of this entry response is an increase in average quality,
which creates a positive externality on firms that would be exporting regardless of the policy.
They receive higher prices on their exports due to improved reputation. New exporters also
benefit from the better reputation as well as the subsidy, so that the increase in aggregate
profits exceeds the tax cost of the subsidy.13 The welfare gain is a direct outcome of higher
long-run reputation. (Figure A.1 in the online Appendix provides a numerical example of the
economy’s transition to its new, higher steady state in a case where the LQE is unique.)
On the contrary, in a HQE, a permanent export subsidy lowers average quality by inducing
low-quality firms to stay exporters longer, while it does not change the incentives and decisions
of high-quality firms which are all already exporters. The number of active low-quality firms
increases but the number of active high-quality firms remains unchanged. The lower average
quality in turn damages the country’s reputation, which decreases the profits of all exporters.
Because of this negative externality from the later exit of low-quality firms, the overall increase
12Since there are no domestic consumers in our model and foreign consumers are not taken into account in
national welfare calculations, the welfare of the exporting country is composed of exporters’ profits and fiscal
balance.
13In a setting where firms would set prices in a competitive way, we would have to balance this gain against
the argument that an export subsidy tends to subsidize foreign consumers.
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in aggregate profits of all firms receiving the subsidy is not large enough to cover the cost of
the policy, despite a higher volume of sales.14 (Online Appendix Figure A.2 illustrates the
transition to the new steady state in a HQE when an export subsidy is introduced.)
Hence, depending on the kind of equilibrium regime considered (HQE or LQE), an export
subsidy could raise or lower welfare in the exporting country. Overall, the desirability of
an export subsidy depends on the trade-o↵ between encouraging entry by high-quality firms
which are deterred by the cost of establishing a reputation, and inducing entry by low-quality
fly-by-night firms. The former impact dominates for countries initially exporting primarily
low-quality goods, while the latter prevails for countries that already export a large share of
high-quality goods. This result is new compared to the existing literature.15 It reconciles
the argument that export subsidies can help high-quality firms enter a market when they are
initially unable to separate from low-quality firms (as in Bagwell and Staiger, 1989) with the
criticism by Grossman and Horn (1988) according to which an export subsidy does encourage
entry but the marginal entrants are the ones with the greatest incentive to produce low-quality
goods. Our model delivers both of these predictions, depending on the initial equilibrium type.
It suggests, in particular, that the gain from such policies – or lack thereof – may critically
depend on the level of development and export sophistication of the exporting country.
5.2 A Tax/Subsidy Program
Let us now assume that the government is able to observe the “age” of a firm, i.e. the number
of periods it has previously exported. Starting from a LQE, is there a tax/subsidy scheme
based on the duration of export experience that will replicate the perfect information outcome?
It is noteworthy to observe first that a temporary subsidy (subsidizing entrants) can never
do better than a permanent subsidy to all exporters. A subsidy that targets new firms only
disproportionately benefits low-quality firms, which account for a higher share of entrants than
14Intuitively, we can decompose the welfare e↵ect into two components. For the combination of quality and
export experience for which firms are active both with and without the subsidy, the e↵ect is negative: they
receive lower prices and the additional profits brought about by the subsidy are taken out of taxes. For the
additional periods in which firms below ✓⇤ stay in the market because of the subsidy, their profits fall short of
the cost of the subsidy: otherwise, since the price is lower than in the absence of the policy, they would have
been exporting without the subsidy. Therefore, the total welfare change is unambiguously negative.
15The case for export subsidies is mixed in the existing literature. Brander and Spencer (1985) first introduced
the idea of welfare-enhancing subsidies in a Cournot strategic rivalry, and Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006)
developed an infant-industry argument for protective trade policy. Mayer (1984) also argues that when actual
consumption experiences are required to learn about a commodity’s qualities, subsidization of infant-exporters
can be justified as a first-best policy measure. Modeling explicitly the process of consumer learning and
expectations formation, Bagwell and Staiger (1989) explore the role of export subsidies when foreign goods
are initially of unknown quality to domestic consumers; they show that while absent export subsidies entry of
high-quality firms may be blocked by their inability to sell at prices reflecting their true quality, export subsidies
can break this entry barrier and increase welfare. Flam and Helpman (1987) find that the desirability of export
subsidies is ambiguous, depending on the production structure. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) show
that subsidies improve productivity in a model with heterogeneous firms, but are nonetheless detrimental to
welfare due to losses in terms of trade and variety. The main arguments for active trade policy relying on
coordination failures and externalities are reviewed and assessed in Harrison and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010).
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incumbents. As such, infant industry protection in the traditional sense is counterproductive
in our model: it would lower average quality, worsen the country’s reputation and hurt overall
profits. A more promising alternative is to tax entrants and subsidize incumbents, so as to
improve the relative payo↵s of high-quality firms compared to low quality firms. In order
to replicate the perfect information equilibrium, the tax should deter firms below ✓⇤ from
entering the market, but the subsequent subsidy should be su cient to enable all firms above
✓⇤ to earn positive intertemporal profits. However, the design of the tax/subsidy scheme must
take into account the fact that if it is successful, the endogenous reputation change also a↵ects
the profitability of entry and exit. In fact, we show that when using taxes and subsidies based
on age to replicate the perfection information outcome, the policy may actually involve taxing
firms in a number of periods and only subsidizing the “oldest” exporters.
Proposition 4 (Taxes and Subsidies based on Export Experience)
The perfect information entry and exit decisions by quality and export experience can be
replicated by the following tax/subsidy scheme, where ⌧s is the tax (possibly negative) levied
on a firm that has previously exported s  1 times:
⌧1 =
✓
↵
↵  1
◆
k
1  w   k   w✓m > 0
⌧s =

1  ⇢ (s  1) + 1   
 
 
1
↵  1
k
1  w  
✓
1   
 
◆
⌧1 for s > 1
The resulting steady-state average quality and reputation are
⇣
↵
↵ 1
⌘
✓⇤.
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
The tax/subsidy scheme needs to satisfy three conditions. First, the first-period tax needs
to be high enough that no firm below ✓⇤ earns positive profits in the first period. This
is ensured by setting ⌧1 at least equal to the first-period profits of the lowest quality firm.
Second, the taxes on incumbents need to be large enough not to induce any firm below ✓⇤ to
enter and stay beyond the first period despite initial losses. Third, the taxes on incumbents
also need to be small enough to allow all high-quality firms above ✓⇤ to realize positive expected
profits over time. These three conditions are achieved by setting the tax and subsidy rates as
in Proposition 4. An important point is that there needs not be a large subsidy for continuing
exporters, because the endogenous change in reputation acts as an implicit subsidy for firms
which are still active exporters after the policy is put in place. By discouraging the entry of
low-quality firms, the tax on entrants improves the country reputation, which allows the firms
that remain in the market to charge higher prices. The price e↵ect makes up partially or fully
for the e↵ect of the tax on profits, in such a way that the government needs to compensate
these firms less through later subsidies.
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The large first-period tax can be interpreted as an export license. As long as the gov-
ernment can observe the export tenure of each firm and there is no cost of collecting taxes
and distributing subsidies, this tax/subsidy scheme is optimal from a global welfare point of
view. However, the impact on domestic welfare (not taking into account consumer surplus
in the foreign country) is ambiguous. On the one hand, the low-quality firms that would
export without the tax (below the initial ✓L) lose profits. On the other hand, the firms that
become exporters because of the policy (initially between ✓⇤ and ✓H) gain as they are now
able to realize positive profits; and firms that export in both cases (above ✓H) gain from the
improvement in country reputation.
Lastly, a caveat is that this policy may su↵er from a time inconsistency problem. Once
low-quality firms have decided not to enter, the government has no further incentive to carry
through with the announced taxes and subsidies on continuing exporters. This concern can
be alleviated by the fact that it is a repeated game. In our model with an infinite horizon
and new cohorts of firms every period, if new firms can observe the taxes paid and subsidies
received by older generations of firms, the announced policies need to be implemented for the
government to maintain its credibility with new entrants and sustain the higher steady-state
equilibrium.
5.3 Export Promotion Campaign and Reputation Shocks
An export promotion campaign is an e↵ort to promote the quality of domestic goods abroad,
e.g. through advertisements by export promotion agencies or exporters’ associations, or by
hosting “mega-events” to showcase the country. For instance the Olympic Games in Seoul
in 1988, as well as in Beijing in 2008, were explicitly assigned the goal of promoting the
hosting country’s exports by government o cials.16 Conversely, negative reputation shocks
have been analyzed empirically through event studies, such as the negative perception of
France in the US at the onset of the Iraq war (Michaels and Zhi, 2010) and recalls of Chinese
toys (Freedman et al., 2012). We model an export promotion campaign as a one-shot increase
in the national image µt from the initial steady state, absent any changes in the underlying
quality distribution of firms. More generally, the analysis below applies to reputation shocks –
positive or negative – not driven by changes in the quality distribution. We focus on situations
in which the economy is initially in a stable low-quality equilibrium.
16Preuss (2004) discusses the Korean case and how the Seoul games were intended to “raise international
awareness of Korean manufactured products’ so as to promote Korean exports.” Rose and Spiegel (2011) study
the relevance of this argument. They show that hosting the Olympics boosts a country’s subsequent exports
and find support for the hypothesis that hosting “mega-events” serves as a policy signal.
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5.3.1 Unique Steady State
If the economy has only one long-run equilibrium, it must return to this steady state in the long
run. The export promotion campaign only has short-run e↵ects on the distribution of quality
(Figure A.3 in the online Appendix provides an example of the transition dynamics associated
with a positive shock.) An export promotion campaign results in a one-shot increase in
national reputation µt, starting from the steady state. The initial jump in reputation fosters
entry by firms in segments of the quality distribution where they were previously inactive:
✓H decreases and ✓L increases. The net e↵ect of the entry response is a drop in average
quality ✓ immediately after the shock occurs. Thus, the gap between actual and perceived
average quality leads national reputation to adjust downwards in the following periods. As
the country’s reputation moves back down, the range of qualities for which entrants choose to
stay inactive widens again, driving average quality back up until it has reverted to its original
steady-state value, along with reputation. There are no long-run e↵ects.
5.3.2 Multiple Steady States
If the economy has multiple steady states, there are several low-quality equilibria. Figure 2a
above provides an illustration of this case. Assume the country starts in a stable LQE µS .
If there are no steady states with higher reputation than µS , an export promotion campaign
has the same e↵ects as when the steady state is unique.
If there exists a steady state µ > µS , there must be an even number of steady states with
µ > µS . Let us define µU > µS such that µU is a steady state and for all µS < µ < µU , µ
is not a steady state. Similarly, define µ0S > µU such that µ
0
S is a steady state and for all
µU < µ < µ0S , µ is not a steady state. µU is unstable and µ
0
S is stable.
Starting in µS , a “small” promotion campaign moves national reputation to a level µt
such that µS < µt < µU . The impact of a small campaign is similar to the case with a unique
equilibrium: in the long run, the economy returns to µS . A “large” promotion campaign
moves national reputation to µt > µU . Then, the resulting entry by the intermediate range of
middle-quality firms that were not exporting before the shock (firms below the initial ✓H and
above the initial ✓L) leads to an increase in average quality, magnifying the shock. Actual
quality follows reputation in a self-fulfilling manner. Quality and reputation keep rising until
the economy settles in the more favorable steady-state µ0S . In the example of Figure 2a, µ
0
S
is a high-quality equilibrium. (Figure A.4 in the online Appendix illustrates the transition to
the new steady state.) These results are summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (Positive Reputation Shocks)
(i) Starting from a unique LQE or from a LQE that has the highest µ among steady states,
a one-time positive shock to national reputation µt increases aggregate profits and decreases
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average quality in the short run, and has no e↵ect in the long run.
(ii) Starting from a stable LQE µS such that there exist other steady states above µS,
a small one-time positive shock (µt < µU as defined above) to national reputation increases
aggregate profits and may increase or decrease average quality in the short-run, and has no
e↵ect in the long-run.
(iii) Starting from a stable LQE µS such that there exist other steady states above µS,
a large one-time positive shock (µt > µU as defined above) to national reputation increases
aggregate profits and average quality both in the short-run and in the long-run.
Proof: see Appendix A.5.
To sum up, a policy which brings about a positive shock to national reputation has only
short-lived e↵ects on the quality distribution of exporters and on aggregate profits in a unique
steady state or if the shock is small. However, a large shock starting from a low-reputation,
low-quality equilibrium is self-fulfilling when the economy has multiple steady states. It
encourages entry by high-quality firms. In the segments of the average quality-reputation
function where entry by high-quality firms drives up quality more than entry by lower-quality
firms drives it down, a one-shot increase in reputation brings about a permanent increase in
quality, profits and welfare. To be successful in the long run, an export promotion campaign
based solely on improving the country’s brand image must therefore induce a large jump in
beliefs. A negative reputation shock has the opposite e↵ects, as stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 (Negative Reputation Shocks)
(i) Starting from a unique LQE or from a LQE that has the lowest µ among steady states,
a one-time negative shock to national reputation µt reduces aggregate profits and increases
average quality in the short-run, and has no e↵ect in the long-run.
(ii) Starting from a stable LQE µ0S such that there exist other steady states below µ
0
S,
a small one-time negative shock (µt > µU as defined above) to national reputation reduces
aggregate profits and may increase or decrease average quality in the short-run, and has no
e↵ect in the long-run.
(iii) Starting from a stable LQE µ0S such that there exists other steady states below µ
0
S,
a large one-time negative shock (µt < µU as defined above) to national reputation reduces
aggregate profits and average quality both in the short-run and in the long-run.
This last result implies that there can be long-term consequences of a sudden large drop in
reputation, which moves a country to a less desirable steady-state equilibrium. In particular,
large product recalls or heavily mediatized consumer safety scandals concerning exports of
one country can permanently a↵ect the structure of its industry, lowering both quality and
reputation in the long-run.
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5.4 Minimum Quality Standards
Finally, we examine the e↵ect of imposing minimum quality standards. Quality standards have
been used by Japan at the end of World War II. At that time, “Made in Japan” goods had
a reputation for being cheap low-quality goods. Japanese companies were su↵ering from an
inferior “national brand”. To improve this “national brand”, both Japanese private companies
and the government decided to impose strict quality norms (Matsushita, 1979). They formed
export cartels which provided product quality guarantees, by setting product design and
quality standards, establishing industry brand names, guaranteeing delivery schedules and
mediating disputes between individual exporters and foreign buyers (Dyck, 1992). Providing
product quality assurances to importers stimulated growth in exports, improved terms of
trade, and was key to establish a reputation for product quality (Lynn and McKeown, 1988).
We model a quality standard by a “quality standard threshold” ✓MQ.17 We assume that
if a firm of quality ✓ < ✓MQ is controlled, then it has to exit the export market and cannot
re-enter later.18 Inspection is costly for the government and we denote the inspection cost
c, where c = c (✓MQ). To the extent that it is more di cult to certify higher quality, it is
natural to expect c0 (✓MQ)   0.
If we first assume that the controlling cost is negligible and independent of the quality
threshold, then it is obvious that from a global welfare point of view, it is optimum to set
✓MQ = ✓⇤. In other words, it is socially ine cient from a global welfare point of view to
let firms of quality ✓ below ✓⇤ to enter the export market. Is it optimal for the domestic
country? For the exporting country, the welfare e↵ect of the minimum quality standard has
three components (see Appendix A.6 for more details). Let us call µinit the initial steady-
state reputation µ, and define ✓L,init ⌘ µinit kw and ✓H,init ⌘ k (1 A⇢)µinitA⇢ w . First, for firms
with quality ✓ < ✓L,init, the e↵ect is unambiguously negative: these firms were exporting as
fly-by-night before the introduction of the minimum standard, making positive profits. With
the minimum quality standard, they cannot enter the export market. Second, for firms with
quality ✓⇤ < ✓ < ✓H,init, the e↵ect is unambiguously positive: these firms were not exporting
before the introduction of the minimum standard. With the minimum quality standard, they
now enter the export market and remain exporters until they are hit by the exogenous exit
shock. The value of their profit stream is positive. Third, for firms with quality ✓ > ✓H,init,
the e↵ect is also unambiguously positive: these firms receive extra profits brought by a higher
reputation. The lower ↵ (the shape parameter of the distribution), the lower the loss from
the minimum quality standard. Intuitively, a low ↵ means that there are more firms at the
right tail of the distribution, and so relatively less firms that lose from the standard. The
17For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the inspection probability is always equal to 100%.
18The minimum quality standard acts as the exogenous exit shock  , but with an important di↵erence: the
controlled firm has to exit the export market after it incurs the production cost w✓ + k and before it can sell
its good, i.e. make any profits. The controlled firms of quality ✓ < ✓MQ thus makes losses.
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lost profits due to the minimum quality standard also decrease with production costs, while
they increase with the initial reputation: the higher the reputation, the higher the profits the
fly-by-night firms were able to extract when they exported for one period.
There are two important caveats to this insight. First, even if the controlling process is
costless and the minimum quality standard ✓MQ = ✓⇤ is welfare improving for the exporting
country, under certain conditions, it might be in the interest of the exporting country to
set the quality standard below ✓⇤. On the one hand, a lower quality standard reduces the
importance of the profits forgone by firms that do not meet the standard. On the other hand,
the higher the quality standard, the higher the profits of high-quality firms due to the higher
reputation. Moreover, the quality standard has to be high enough for the economy to move
from a LQE to a HQE. The second caveat is the following: if the controlling cost to certify
quality is too high, one may need to supplement the minimum quality standard with export
subsidies. Indeed, it may be too costly for the government to set a minimum quality standard
high enough to support a HQE. In this case, it may be optimal to choose a lower quality
standard and to subsidize firms (to induce more relatively high-quality firms to start and
continue exporting).
6 Additional Predictions
This last section lays out additional empirical predictions of our model on the dynamic pat-
terns of price and turnover rates among exporters.
6.1 Unit Prices
We first characterize the path of prices for a given cohort of firms. At the firm level, there is
a “brand premium” for high-quality firms both in a HQE and in a LQE: the price charged
increases over time for a given good provided that its quality is higher than the country
average. Result 1 establishes that on average, incumbents receive higher prices than entrants,
and the average price among a cohort of firms is higher, the longer the cohort has been active
on export markets. This result follows from the fact that over time, an increasing fraction
of prices reflect firms’ true quality parameters, and the average quality of a cohort of firms
weakly increases over time as the lowest quality firms exit.
Result 1 (Unit Prices)
In a steady-state low-quality equilibrium, the average unit price charged at t + s by firms
born at date t is strictly increasing in s.
In a steady-state high-quality equilibrium, the average unit price charged at t+ s by firms
born at date t is strictly increasing in s for all s if µ > ↵↵ 1✓1 and for s   T
 
↵ 1
↵ µ
 
otherwise.
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Proof: see Appendix A.7.
These predictions are supported by the findings of Foster et al. (2008) on the behavior
of US firms in their domestic market. They show that entering businesses have significantly
lower prices than incumbents, and that prices rise with plant age. The empirical literature on
pricing strategies is also consistent with this result19, although there can be other explanations
for entrants charging lower prices.20
6.2 Hazard rate
A second prediction implied by our model is that firms’ exit rates vary systematically with
their quality and across cohorts.
Result 2 (Hazard Rate) In a steady-state equilibrium, the aggregate hazard rate is weakly
decreasing in quality and in firms’ export experience.
Proof: see Appendix A.8.
The first part of Result 2 establishes that across cohorts, the fraction of active firms that
exit per period is higher for lower-quality firms, both in a LQE and in a HQE. Low-quality
firms exit voluntarily in finite time while high-quality firms only exit when hit by the exit
shock. The second part states that the probability of exit, across quality levels, decreases
with the age of a cohort. It derives from the fact that the distribution of quality among older
cohorts has a higher lower bound than among younger cohorts.
This last prediction is consistent with the findings of Besedes and Prusa (2006) on survival
rates in US import relationships at the disaggregated product level. They estimate that the
probability that the import relationship will end falls with its duration for di↵erentiated
products.
19Firm’s usage of introductory pricing strategies is indeed often observed: software is usually o↵ered at a
very low price in initial periods whereas updates are expensive; phone companies or network providers have low
price deals for new services (see e.g. van Ackere and Reyniers, 1995; Gabszewicz and Garcia, 2007). Benkard
(2004) considers the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft and gives the example of the Lockheed L-1011,
whose price was below static marginal cost for essentially its entire 14-year production run, for a total variable
loss of approximately 2.5 billion current dollars. Bhattacharya and Vogt (2003) show that in the market for
pharmaceutical drugs, the price of a branded drug commonly rises after its patent expires and lower-price
generic drugs enter the market.
20Introductory pricing strategies, whereby buyers would pay a low price in the initial period and o↵er a
sequence of prices contingent on their future consumption experience, can be rationalized in several classes of
models. See e.g. Gabszewicz et al. (1992) who examine first mover advantages in a new product market with
sequential entry and show that the first entrant’s optimal strategy is to set a low introductory price. Bagwell
(1987) shows that in a two-period game between firms and consumers, where firms are privately informed
about their individual costs, and consumers must pay a search cost in order to learn a firm’s current price,
consumers have incentive to use introductory price as a signal of cost.
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7 Conclusion
We have shown that when consumers are not fully informed about the quality of what they
buy, national reputation matters for exporters. The inability to reveal quality to consumers
before purchase distorts the incentives to enter export markets for new firms. Low-quality
firms rely on the national brand, while high-quality firms su↵er from it. More broadly, unob-
servable quality tilts the long-run quality composition of an export-oriented industry towards
its low end, all the more so as the exporting economy has a poor reputation for quality. In
that respect, reputation has self-perpetuating features since future national reputation adjusts
to past exports quality. These issues are particularly relevant for developing countries trying
to grow into exporting increasingly sophisticated goods. National reputations create history
dependence in the range of goods a country can successfully export. A damaged national
reputation is a barrier to entry for companies that develop more expensive high-quality prod-
ucts, threatening the success of such a growth strategy. In those cases, we have examined
several possible policy responses designed to enhance the quality reputation and welfare of an
exporting country.
This analysis suggests several avenues for future empirical research. In our model, the
rational expectations steady-state can fall into one of two categories. In a high-quality equi-
librium, all firms are able to export: low-quality firms enter initially as fly-by-nights and
eventually exit after a given number of periods; high-quality firms enter and keep exporting.
In a low-quality equilibrium, an intermediate range of middle-quality firms never become ac-
tive exporters. This di↵erence in the sorting of firms into exporters and non exporters may
be useful for future empirical research to identify low-quality traps. In addition, case studies
have already provided evidence of the benefits of a reputation for quality in terms of brand
premia (Imbs et al., 2010) and image spillovers across products of the same brand (Sullivan,
1990). We develop these insights further by considering the demand for imports, where initial
priors depend on country-of-origin and reputations are built not only for specific firms but
also for exporting countries as a whole. Our findings imply that future research could analyze
empirically the extent to which country’s reputation matters for trade flows.
Going further, our analysis provides a framework for a richer understanding of firms’
sourcing decisions through the lens of a strategic use of “made in” rules. Exporters can find it
optimal to resort to original equipment manufacturers or depart from the cost-minimizing way
of splitting the production process across locations, in order to obtain a favorable country-of-
origin denomination. The location of manufacturing and assembly will be decided not only
according to cost considerations, but also depending on the regulations surrounding rules
of origin, consumer sensitivity to quality, and the degree of asymmetric information in the
industry. An extension of our model along these lines would generate testable predictions at
the firm level. These topics will be investigated in future research.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1: Sorting of Firms into Exports
A.1.1 High-Quality Equilibrium
Assume there is a steady state equilibrium where µ > k1 w . First, consider firms with ✓ < ✓
⇤
born at date t. Since their expected profits are decreasing with time, they are active in the
first period if and only if Et⇡t+1 (✓) = µ w✓ k > 0, which requires ✓  µ kw . Since µ > k1 w ,
it is straightforward that µ kw > µ > ✓
⇤ which ensures Et⇡t+1 (✓) > 0 for all firms born at t
which have quality ✓ < ✓⇤. Hence all such firms enter initially. Also, ✓ < k1 w and ⇢
0 > 0
imply that
Et⇡t+s (✓) = (⇢ (s  1)  w) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (s  1))µ  k
is decreasing in s and lims!1Et⇡t+s = (1  w) ✓   k < 0 so all firms below ✓⇤ expect to exit
in finite time when their profits turn negative. The expected number of periods a firm ✓ born
at t is active is T (✓) given by
[1  ⇢ (T (✓   1))]µ > [w   ⇢ (T (✓)  1)] ✓ + k
and [1  ⇢ (T (✓))]µ < [w   ⇢ (T (✓))] ✓ + k
The highest quality type ✓T that exits after selling for T periods (or the lowest quality type
that exits after selling for T + 1 periods) is defined by Et⇡t+T+1 (✓T ) = 0, hence
✓T = max
⇢
k   [1  ⇢ (T )]µ
⇢ (T )  w , ✓m
 
(20)
and ✓T is increasing with T :
@✓T
@T
/ ⇢0 (T ) (µ (1  w)  k) > 0 as ⇢0 > 0 and µ > ✓⇤
Second, consider firms with ✓⇤ < ✓ < µ. These firms expect positive profits at all periods:
they have Et⇡t+s (✓) monotonically decreasing from
⇡t+1 (✓) = µ  w✓   k > µ (1  w)  k > 0 since ✓ < µ
to
lim
s!1Et⇡t+s (✓) = ✓ (1  w)  k > 0 since ✓ > ✓
⇤
Hence firms with ✓⇤ < ✓ < µ always enter the market and stay until they are exogenously
forced to exit.
Finally, consider the highest quality firms with ✓ > µ. Such firms have increasing expected
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profits over time. They enter the market if and only if their expected intertemporal profits
are positive, which requires:
Et
 1X
s=1
 s 1⇡t+s (✓)
!
=
1X
s=0
 s [(⇢ (s)  w) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (s))µ]  k
1    > 0
or equivalently:
✓ >
k   µ (1   )P1s=0  s (1  ⇢ (s))
(1   )P1s=0  s⇢ (s)  w ⌘ ✓H (21)
Let us show that ✓H < µ. Rearranging:
✓H < µ i↵ µ
"
(1   )
1X
s=0
 s (1  ⇢ (s)) + (1   )
1X
s=0
 s⇢ (s)
#
> wµ+ k
or equivalently i↵ µ > k1 w which holds by assumption in the high reputation case. Hence all
firms with ✓ > µ always export until they are hit by the exogenous shock.
A.1.2 Low-Quality Equilibrium
Assume there is a steady state equilibrium with µ < k1 w . First, consider firms with ✓ < µ
born at date t. Since their expected profits are decreasing with time, they are active in the
first period if and only if Et⇡t+1 (✓) = µ w✓   k > 0, which requires ✓  µ kw ⌘ ✓L. We can
immediately check that µ < k1 w , ✓L < µ. Expected second-period profits are
Et⇡t+2 (✓) = (⇢ (1)  w) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (1))µ  k < (1  w)µ  k < 0
since ✓ < µ and ⇢ (1) > w. Hence among firms with ✓ < µ, those with ✓ < ✓L are active in
the first period and exit afterwards, and those with ✓L  ✓ < µ are never active.
Second, consider firms with µ  ✓ < ✓⇤. These firms have Et⇡t+1 (✓) < 0 since ✓ > ✓L,
Et⇡t+s (✓) monotonically increasing in s since ✓   µ, and lims!1Et⇡t+s (✓) < 0 since ✓ < ✓⇤.
Thus their expected profits are negative in all periods and they optimally exit after drawing
their quality parameter.
Third, consider firms with ✓ > ✓⇤. These firms have Et⇡t+s (✓) monotonically increasing
in s since ✓ > µ, and lims!1Et⇡t+s (✓) > 0 since ✓ > ✓⇤. If they decide to be active in the
first period, they expect to remain in the market as long as they survive the exogenous shock.
However given ✓ > ✓L they incur a loss in the initial periods. The condition for a firm of
type ✓ > ✓⇤ to be active is for intertemporal expected profits to be positive, which requires
✓ > k (1 A⇢)µA⇢ w ⌘ ✓H as derived in (21), where we define A⇢ ⌘ (1   )
P1
s=0  
s⇢ (s). Finally,
✓H > ✓
⇤ , k   (1 A⇢)µ
A⇢   w >
k
1  w , k (1 A⇢) > (1 A⇢)µ (1  w)
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which is equivalent to k1 w > µ and holds by definition in the low reputation case. Hence
firms with ✓⇤  ✓  ✓H are never active and firms with ✓ > ✓H enter the export market and
stay active.
Lastly, the equilibrium reputation must satisfy µ > k +w✓m. Suppose µ is a steady state
reputation and µ < k + w✓m. The first period price µ does not cover the production cost of
the lowest quality firm, hence no firm below ✓⇤ finds it profitable to enter. It follows that no
rational expectations equilibrium can have µ < ✓⇤, so there is no LQE with µ < k + w✓m.
Similarly, if ✓⇤ < µ < k + w✓m, then firms with ✓ < µ would have negative profits in all
periods. Hence such firms are never active, and µ cannot be a HQE reputation under rational
expectations.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2: Existence Conditions
Proposition 2 establishes the existence of at least one steady state equilibrium and the pos-
sibility of multiple equilibria. We investigate how ✓ (µ) varies with µ on [✓m,1). Then, we
compute the fixed points of the function ✓ (µ), and show that there can be multiple fixed
points.
A.2.1 Average Quality Function
Given Proposition 1 and equation (11), the average quality ✓ of active firms in a steady state
as a function of the country reputation µ is, on [✓m, ✓⇤]:
✓ (µ) = µ0
0BB@(1   )
✓
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1◆
+
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ 1
(1   )
⇣
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵⌘
+
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵
1CCA (22)
and on [✓⇤,1):
✓ (µ) = µ0
0BB@1 
P1
T=0  
T+1
✓⇣
✓m
✓T
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓T+1⌘↵ 1◆
1 P1T=0  T+1 ⇣⇣ ✓m✓T ⌘↵   ⇣ ✓m✓T+1⌘↵⌘
1CCA
= µ0
0B@1 +P1T=T˜  T
⇣
✓m
✓T
⌘↵ 1
1 +
P1
T=T˜  
T
⇣
✓m
✓T
⌘↵
1CA
(23)
where T˜ is the lowest value of T such that ✓T > ✓m in equation (20). At µ = ✓⇤, ✓L = ✓H = ✓⇤
and ✓T = ✓⇤ for all T . It follows that the function ✓ (µ) is continuous at ✓⇤ since both equations
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above yield:
✓ (✓⇤) = µ0
 
1    +     ✓m✓⇤  ↵ 1
1    +     ✓m✓⇤  ↵
!
(24)
A.2.2 Equilibrium Existence
A steady state equilibrium is a fixed point of the function ✓ (µ) defined in A.2.1. We have
already established that the function is continuous on [✓m,1). Let us show in addition that
✓ (✓m) > ✓m and limµ!1 ✓(µ)µ < 1.
If µ = ✓m, no firm below ✓⇤ finds it profitable to export, as national reputation imposes
a first-period loss on all firms. Some firms with high enough ✓ have a positive NPV of
future profits and enter. So since ✓m is the lower bound of the prior quality distribution,
✓ (✓m) > ✓⇤ > ✓m.
As µ!1, it remains profitable for all firms to stay active, so firms of all qualities continue
exporting until hit by the exogenous shock: T (✓)!1 for all ✓. Therefore, limµ!1 ✓ (µ) = µ0
which is finite, so limµ!1 ✓(µ)µ = 0 < 1.
By the fixed point theorem, we have established that ✓ (.) has at least one fixed point on
[✓m,1).
A.2.3 Existence Condition for a High Quality Equilibrium
A HQE is a steady state equilibrium with equilibrium reputation above ✓⇤. Therefore a
su cient condition for the existence of a HQE is ✓ (✓⇤) > ✓⇤ in (24). We then prove that this
is also a necessary condition and that if there exists at least one HQE, there is only one HQE.
Let us show that ✓ (µ) is strictly decreasing in µ on [✓⇤,1). We can rewrite (23) as:
✓ (µ) = µ0
✓
1 +K (↵  1)
1 +K (↵)
◆
where K (↵) ⌘
1X
T=T˜
 T
✓
✓m
✓T
◆↵
@K (↵)
@↵
=
1X
T=T˜
 T ln (✓m/✓T )
✓
✓m
✓T
◆↵
< 0
Consider a positive change in one of the thresholds, ✓S , leaving unchanged all other thresh-
olds. Then all else equal, average quality rises:
@✓
@✓S
=
 S
✓S
✓
✓m
✓S
◆↵ 1 
↵
✓
✓m
✓S
◆
(1 +K (↵  1))  (↵  1) (1 +K (↵))
 
=
 S
✓S
✓
✓m
✓S
◆↵ 1
(1 +K (↵))

↵
✓
✓m
✓S
◆
✓
µ0
  (↵  1)
 
=
 S
✓S
✓
✓m
✓S
◆↵ 1
(1 +K (↵)) (↵  1)
✓
✓
✓S
◆
  1
 
> 0
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which derives from ✓ > ✓⇤ > ✓S for all S in a HQE. An increase in µ lowers all ✓T given
Assumptions 1 and 2 and di↵erentiating:
@✓T
@µ
=   1  ⇢ (T )
⇢ (T )  w < 0
Thus, in a HQE, ✓ (µ) is a decreasing function:
@✓
@µ
=
1X
T=T˜
@✓
@✓T
@✓T
@µ
< 0
We have proved that ✓ (.) is strictly and continuously decreasing in µ on [✓⇤,1). It follows
that ✓ (.) has at most one fixed point on [✓⇤,1). Hence ✓ (✓⇤) > ✓⇤ is a necessary and su cient
condition for the existence of a HQE, and if this condition is satisfied, there is only one HQE.
Lastly, we express the condition for ✓ (✓⇤) > ✓⇤ as a function of fundamental parameters.
At µ = ✓⇤, ⇡t (✓) < 0 for all t > 1 and ✓ < ✓⇤. Then:
✓ (✓⇤) =
R ✓⇤
✓m
✓dG (✓) + 11  
R1
✓⇤ ✓dG (✓)R ✓⇤
✓m
dG (✓) + 11  
R1
✓⇤ dG (✓)
= µ0
 
1    +     ✓m✓⇤  ↵ 1
1    +     ✓m✓⇤  ↵
!
So ✓ (✓⇤) > ✓⇤ is equivalent to µ0
 
1  + 
⇣
✓m(1 w)
k
⌘↵ 1
1  + 
⇣
✓m(1 w)
k
⌘↵
!
> k1 w , which after substituting
for the value of µ0 and rearranging yields the following condition for the existence of a HQE:
↵
✓
✓m (1  w)
k
◆
+
 
1   
✓
✓m (1  w)
k
◆↵
> ↵  1
Conversely, there is no HQE and there is at least one LQE i↵:
↵
✓
✓m (1  w)
k
◆
+
 
1   
✓
✓m (1  w)
k
◆↵
< ↵  1
A.2.4 Multiple Equilibria
While there cannot be more than one HQE, we show that the non-monotonicity of ✓ (.) on
[✓m, ✓⇤] creates the possibility of multiple equilibria. A LQE is a fixed point of ✓ (µ) given
by (22) on [✓m, ✓⇤]. On this interval, we can show that the sign of @✓(µ)@µ is indeterminate.
Di↵erentiating with respect to each threshold:
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@✓
@✓L
=
µo (↵  1)
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ ✓ 1✓L
◆✓
✓m
✓L
◆↵ 1 
1  ✓
✓L
 
< 0
@✓
@✓H
=
1
1  µo (↵  1)
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ ✓ 1✓H
◆✓
✓m
✓H
◆↵ 1  ✓
✓H
  1
 
< 0
@✓
@µ
=
@✓
@✓L
@✓L
@µ
+
@✓
@✓H
@✓H
@µ
=
µo (↵  1)
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ ⇥ ...
... ⇥
h⇣
✓↵ 1m
✓↵L
⌘ h
✓
✓L
  1
i  
1
w
   11   ⇣ ✓↵ 1m✓↵H ⌘ h1  ✓✓H i ⇣ 1 A⇢A⇢ w⌘i
@✓
@µ
< 0 i↵
1
1   
✓
1
✓H
◆↵ 
1  ✓
✓H
 ✓
1 A⇢
A⇢   w
◆
>
✓
1
✓L
◆↵  ✓
✓L
  1
 ✓
1
w
◆
This condition can be rewritten as:
  > 1 
✓
✓L
✓H
◆↵+1✓✓H   ✓
✓   ✓L
◆✓
(1 A⇢)w
A⇢   w
◆
Then note that the bracketed terms are ✓L✓H =
(µ k)(A⇢ w)
w(k (1 A⇢)µ) and
✓H ✓
✓ ✓L =
k (1 A⇢)µ
A⇢ w  ✓
✓ µ kw
=
w
A⇢ w
✓
1  A⇢(✓ µ)
k µ+w✓
◆
. Therefore ✓ (µ) decreases in µ when:
  > 1 
✓
µ  k
k   (1 A⇢)µ
◆↵+1✓A⇢   w
w
◆↵ 1 
1  A⇢
 
✓   µ 
k   µ+ w✓
!
and increases in µ otherwise. The reason why ✓ (µ) needs not be monotonic over [✓m, ✓⇤] is
that µ has opposite e↵ects on ✓ coming from ✓L and ✓H . Which e↵ect dominates depends
on the position of µ as well as the shape parameter ↵ and the survival parameter  . This
non-monotonicity is what gives rises to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
To sum up, we have shown that if condition (19) holds, there is one HQE and an even
number of LQEs (possibly zero). If condition (19) does not hold, there is no HQE and there
is an odd number of LQEs.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3: Export Subsidies
A.3.1 Low-Quality Equilibrium
In a LQE, average quality is given by:
✓ = µ0
0BB@(1   )
✓
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1◆
+
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ 1
(1   )
⇣
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵⌘
+
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵
1CCA
Di↵erentiating with respect to each threshold:
@✓
@✓L
=
µo (↵  1)
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ ✓ 1✓L
◆✓
✓m
✓L
◆↵ 1✓
1  ✓
✓L
◆
< 0
@✓
@✓H
=
1
1  µo (↵  1)
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ ✓ 1✓H
◆✓
✓m
✓H
◆↵ 1✓ ✓
✓H
  1
◆
< 0
@✓
@k
=
@✓
@✓L
@✓L
@k
+
@✓
@✓H
@✓H
@k
=
µo (↵  1)
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵
+ 11  
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ ⇥ ...
⇥

1
1  
⇣
1
✓H
⌘⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ 1 ⇣
1  ✓✓H
⌘⇣
1
A⇢ w
⌘
 
⇣
1
✓L
⌘⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1 ⇣
✓
✓L
  1
⌘  
1
w
  
@✓
@k
> 0 i↵
1
1   
✓
1
✓H
◆↵✓
1  ✓
✓H
◆✓
1
A⇢   w
◆
>
✓
1
✓L
◆↵✓ ✓
✓L
  1
◆✓
1
w
◆
This condition can be rewritten as
  > 1 
✓
✓L
✓H
◆↵+1✓✓H   ✓
✓   ✓L
◆✓
w
A⇢   w
◆
Then note that, starting from a steady-state (✓ = µ), the bracketed terms are ✓L✓H =
(µ k)(A⇢ w)
w(k (1 A⇢)µ) and
✓H ✓
✓ ✓L =
1
A⇢ w (k (1 w)µ)
1
w (k (1 w)µ)
= wA⇢ w .
Therefore ✓ decreases in k if and only if
  > 1 
✓
µ  k
k   (1 A⇢)µ
◆↵+1✓A⇢   w
w
◆↵ 1
The RHS is decreasing in µ and ↵, so this holds for   not too low, ↵ not too high and an
initial µ not too low. Then starting from a LQE, a decrease in k moves up the ✓ (µ) function
left of the initial µ. The new steady-state equilibrium quality and reputation are necessarily
higher. If the steady-state is unique, the new steady-state has higher µ. If there are multiple
steady-states, ranked by increasing µ, either the new steady-state has the same rank and
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higher µ, or the new steady-state has higher rank and higher µ.
The welfare e↵ect of a subsidy   (  =  dk) has three components. First, for firms with
✓ parameters such that they sell both without and with the subsidy, the policy adds to their
profits the amount it costs to the government, plus the extra profits brought by a higher
reputation µ0 > µ. The total e↵ect is unambiguously positive.
Second, for new exporters that enter around ✓L because of the policy (✓L < ✓ < ✓L0), the
net benefit NBL of the subsidy is positive:
NBL =
Z ✓L0
✓L
 
µ0   w✓   k +    dG (✓)  Z ✓L0
✓L
 g (✓) d✓
NBL =
 
µ0   k  Z ✓L0
✓L
g (✓) d✓   w
Z ✓L0
✓L
✓dG (✓)
=
 
µ0   k  ⇣⇣ ✓m✓L ⌘↵   ⇣ ✓m✓L0 ⌘↵⌘  w ↵↵ 1✓m
✓⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓L0 ⌘↵ 1
◆ 
= w✓m
✓
✓L0
✓L
⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓L0 ⌘↵ 1
◆
  ↵↵ 1
✓⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓L0 ⌘↵ 1
◆ 
> w✓m↵ 1
✓⇣
✓m
✓L
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓L0 ⌘↵ 1
◆
> 0
where we go from the second to the third line using w✓L0 = µ0   k.
Third, for new exporters that enter around ✓H because of the policy (✓H0 < ✓ < ✓H), the
net benefit NBH of the subsidy is also positive:
NBH =
Z ✓H
✓H0
 1X
t=0
 t
 
⇢ (t) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (t))µ0   w✓   k +   ! g (✓) d✓   ...
... 11  
Z ✓H
✓H0
 g (✓) d✓
= 11  
Z ✓H
✓H0
 
(A⇢   w) ✓ + (1 A⇢)µ0   k
 
g (✓) d✓
= 11  

   k   (1 A⇢)µ0  ⇣⇣ ✓m✓H0 ⌘↵   ⇣ ✓m✓H ⌘↵⌘+ ↵(A⇢ w)↵ 1 ✓m
✓⇣
✓m
✓H0
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓H ⌘↵ 1◆ 
= 11   (A⇢   w) ✓m
✓⇣
✓m
✓H0
⌘↵ 1   ✓H0✓H ⇣ ✓m✓H ⌘↵ 1◆  ↵↵ 1 ✓⇣ ✓m✓H0 ⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓H ⌘↵ 1
◆ 
> 11   (A⇢   w) ✓m↵ 1
✓⇣
✓m
✓H0
⌘↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓H ⌘↵ 1◆ > 0
42
So the overall welfare gain is positive.
A.3.2 High-Quality Equilibrium
In a HQE, average quality is given by ✓ = µ0
⇣
1+K(↵ 1)
1+K(↵)
⌘
where K (↵) ⌘ P1T=T˜  T ⇣ ✓m✓T ⌘↵
and ✓T =
k (1 ⇢(T ))µ
⇢(T ) w . Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 2, we have:
@✓T
@k
=
1
⇢ (T )  w > 0 for all T > T˜
@✓
@k
=
1X
T=T˜
@✓
@✓T
@✓T
@k
> 0
Hence a subsidy that lowers k shifts down the ✓ (µ) function. As ✓ is decreasing in µ in the
HQE region, the new steady-state equilibrium defined by ✓ (µ) = µ necessarily has lower µ. So
average quality and national reputation are higher in the HQE steady-state without subsidies
than with subsidies.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4: Tax/Subsidy Scheme
In this section, we show that the age-dependent tax/subsidy in Proposition 4 sustains a
steady-state equilibrium which replicates the perfect information entry and exit patterns by
quality level. First, all per-period profits, and therefore all entry or exit decisions, depend on
µ, which is itself a↵ected by the policy. If the tax/subsidy scheme induces decisions identical
to the perfect information setting, then firms below ✓⇤ never enter and firms above ✓⇤ always
enter and stay. The resulting average quality and steady-state reputation would therefore be:
✓ (µ) = µ =
Z 1
✓⇤
✓dG (✓) =
↵
↵  1✓
⇤
Second, let us show that with µ = ↵↵ 1✓
⇤ and taxes and subsidies set as in Proposition 4,
firms below ✓⇤ choose never to enter. In the first export period, profits are decreasing in ✓.
To show that no firm below ✓⇤ can profitably enter as fly-by-night and exit after one period,
it su ces that a firm of quality ✓m cannot do so.
⇡t+1 (✓m) = µ  k   w✓m   ⌧1
=
↵
↵  1✓
⇤   k   w✓m  

↵
↵  1
✓
k
1  w
◆
  k   w✓m
 
= 0
Hence no firm can realize strictly positive first period profits. However, if subsidies are o↵ered
in later periods, it could still be the case that some firms below ✓⇤ have an incentive to enter
and pay the initial tax in order to benefit from subsidies in later periods. The tax/subsidy
combination for s   2 ensures that this is not the case. The expected per-period profit of a
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continuing exporter is, for s   2:
Et⇡t+s (✓) = (⇢ (s  1)  w) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (s  1)) ↵
↵  1✓
⇤   k   ⌧s
Among low-quality firms, this expression is the highest for firms of quality just below ✓⇤.
Then the definition of ✓⇤ yields:
Et⇡t+s (✓
⇤) = ✓⇤   k   w✓⇤ +
✓
1   
 
◆✓
⌧1   1
↵  1
k
1  w
◆
=
✓
1   
 
◆✓
⌧1   1
↵  1✓
⇤
◆
=
✓
1   
 
◆
(✓⇤   w✓m) > 0
Hence if firm ✓⇤ enters, it incurs a loss in the first period and positive profits thereafter.
It follows that it never exits voluntarily and its intertemporal expected profits are:
Et
1X
s=1
 s 1⇡t+s (✓⇤) = ⇡t+1 (✓⇤) +
1X
s=2
 s 1
✓
1   
 
◆✓
⌧1   1
↵  1✓
⇤
◆
=
↵
↵  1✓
⇤   k   w✓⇤   ⌧1 + ⌧1   1
↵  1✓
⇤
= ✓⇤   k   w✓⇤ = 0
Since the after-tax, after-subsidy profits of continuing exporters are increasing in ✓, it follows
that firms below ✓⇤ realize negative intertemporal profits regardless of their exit date and
never enter.
Third, by the same token, all firms above ✓⇤ have initially negative profits but a positive
net present value of their profit stream, and have no incentive to exit voluntarily. Finally,
note that ⌧s can be rewritten as:
⌧s =
✓
1  ⇢ (s  1)
↵  1
◆
✓⇤   1   
 
(✓⇤   k   w✓m)
where the second term is negative. ⌧1 is positive and given Assumption 1, ⌧s is decreasing in
s, ⌧2 may be positive or negative, and ⌧s negative for s large enough.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5: Positive Reputation Shocks
This appendix section provides a sketch of the proof of Proposition 5. It essentially relies on
the stability of µS and µ0S and the instability of µU . For (i) and (ii), let us show that if µS
is a steady-state LQE and @✓(µ)@µ < 0 at µS , then µS is a stable equilibrium for ⌘ < 1. Define
✓L,S ⌘ µS kw and ✓H,S ⌘ k (1 A⇢)µSA⇢ w . At time t   1 the economy is in an initial steady-state
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where
µS = ✓ (µS) = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,S
⌘↵ 1
+
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵ 1
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,S
⌘↵
+
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵
1CA
Suppose ✓ is locally decreasing in µ. Then for all µS < µ < µU , ✓ (µ) < µ. Now suppose
there is a perturbation at time t such that µt = µS + ", " > 0 and " < µU   µS . The entry
thresholds at t are:
✓L,t =
µt   k
w
=
µS + "  k
w
✓H,t =
k   (1   )P1u=0 (1  ⇢ (u))µt+u
A⇢   w
where ✓H,t is determined by the zero intertemporal profits condition
1X
u=0
 u [(⇢ (u)  w) ✓H,t + (1  ⇢ (u))Etµt+u   k]
and the absence of aggregate uncertainty allows us to remove the expectations operator.
Let us conjecture, to be verified, that µS  µt+u+1  µt+u  µS + " for all u   1. Then:
✓L,S < ✓L,t+u+1 < ✓L,t+u < ✓L,t
✓H,S > ✓H,t+u+1 > ✓H,t+u > ✓H,t
for all u   1
The average quality of exports is determined by the ✓L and ✓H thresholds in the periods after
the shock in the following manner: for u   0,
✓t+u = µ0
0BB@1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,t+u
⌘↵ 1
+
uP
l=0
 u l
⇣
✓m
✓H,t+l
⌘↵ 1
+
1P
l=u+1
 l
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵ 1
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,t+u
⌘↵
+
uP
l=0
 u l
⇣
✓m
✓H,t+l
⌘↵
+
1P
l=u+1
 l
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵
1CCA
✓L,t+u =
µt+u   k
w
✓H,t+u =
k   (1   )P1l=0 (1  ⇢ (l))µt+u+l
A⇢   w
At time t, let us define ✓
perm
t as the average quality that would prevail if firms expected
the shock to be permanent, i.e. if Etµt+u = µt for all u   0. We calculate:
✓t = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,t
⌘↵ 1
+
⇣
✓m
✓H,t
⌘↵ 1
+  1  
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵ 1
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,t
⌘↵
+  1  
⇣
✓m
✓H,t
⌘↵
+  1  
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵
1CA
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✓t < ✓
perm
t = µ0
0BBB@
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,t
⌘↵ 1
+
✓
✓m
✓permH,t
◆↵ 1
+  1  
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵ 1
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,t
⌘↵
+  1  
✓
✓m
✓permH,t
◆↵
+  1  
⇣
✓m
✓H,S
⌘↵
1CCCA
as ✓permH,t =
k (1 A⇢)(µS+")
A⇢ w < ✓H,t from the conjecture µS  µt+u+1  µt+u  µS + " for all
u   1. Also
✓
perm
t < ✓ (µS + ") < µt
The first inequality results from ✓H,S > ✓
perm
H,t . The second inequality comes from ✓ (µ) < µ
for µ 2 (µS , µU ). Hence ✓t < µt and therefore:
✓t < µt+1 = µt + ⌘
 
✓t   µt
 
< µt
Additionally as long as ⌘ is not too close to 1, µt+1 > µS .
We can show, similarly, that in all subsequent periods, ✓t+u < µt+u as long as µt+u > µS .
Thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u and the conjecture that µt+u follows a decreasing path from
µS+ " to µS is verified. In case of a negative shock to µ at time t starting from a steady-state
where ✓ is locally decreasing in µ, the proof is identical with opposite signs. It follows that if
µS is a steady-state reputation and ✓ (µ) is locally decreasing in µ at µS , then µS is stable.
Any positive shock, starting from µS , that brings µt to a value in (µS , µU ) has no long-run
e↵ects as the economy moves back to µS .
By the same reasoning, µU is unstable. Suppose there is a negative shock to µ starting
from
µU = ✓ (µU ) = µ0
0B@1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,U
⌘↵ 1
+
⇣
✓m
✓H,U
⌘↵ 1
1 
⇣
✓m
✓L,U
⌘↵
+
⇣
✓m
✓H,U
⌘↵
1CA
where ✓L,U ⌘ µU kw , ✓H,U ⌘ k (1 A⇢)µUA⇢ w and ✓ (µ) is increasing in µ at µU . At time t,
µt = µU   ", where " > 0 and " < µU   µS . We conjecture µS  µt+u+1  µt+u  µU   ",
which implies ✓L,S < ✓L,t+u+1 < ✓L,t+u < ✓L,U and ✓H,S > ✓H,t+u+1 > ✓H,t+u > ✓H,U for all
u   0. Then ✓t+u < µt+u and thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u   0.
For part (iii), consider a “large shock”, starting from µS , as a shock " > µU   µS such
that if µt = µS + ", then µ > µU , where ✓t is defined as in (ii) and µ is defined below. ✓t+u,
✓L,t+u and ✓H,t+u are defined as in part (ii). Also, for µU < µ < µ0S , we know that ✓ (µ) > µ.
We can then show that ✓t+u is increasing in u as long as ✓t+u < µ0S , and µt+u is increasing
in u for u   u if µt+u > µU for all u   0. u is the inflexion point of the path of µt+u, which
can initially decrease but is eventually increasing as long as µ < µ0S . Define µ = µt+u, a large
reputation shock is a shock such that µ > µU . It ensures that reputation and average quality
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both grow along the transition path until the economy reaches the steady-state µ0S .
Finally, note that more entry and higher reputation in the long-run imply higher aggregate
profits and higher average quality. The latter follows from ✓ = µ in the long run. The former
results from a higher number of active firms and the fact that the range of firms which are
active both with the initial µ and with the higher final µ receive a higher sequence of prices.
A.6 Minimum Quality Standard
Let us assume a minimum quality standard ✓QS = ✓⇤, such that all the firms with ✓ < ✓⇤
choose not to enter the export market. Thanks to this minimum quality standard, an economy
initially in a stable LQE will move to a HQE. In this HQE, all the firms of quality ✓ > ✓⇤ will
export. Then the average quality of exports across quality levels and cohorts of firms is ✓t =R1
✓⇤ ✓Nt(✓)d✓R1
✓⇤ Nt(✓)d✓
, where the total number of active firms of quality ✓ is given by Nt (✓) =
1
1  g (✓).
Simple calculations give us ✓ (µ) = ↵↵ 1✓
⇤.
Let us call µinit the initial steady-state reputation µ (before the minimum quality stan-
dard), and define ✓L,init ⌘ µinit kw and ✓H,S ⌘ k (1 A⇢)µinitA⇢ w . The welfare e↵ect of the minimum
quality standard for the exporting country has three components. First, for firms with quality
✓ < ✓L,init, the e↵ect is unambiguously negative: these firms were exporting as fly-by-night
before the introduction of the minimum standard making positive profits. With the minimum
quality standard, they cannot enter the export market. In the initial LQE, the total number
of active firms of quality ✓ < ✓L,init was g (✓) and given that these firms exported just for one
period, their profit was µinit   w✓   k. Hence the lost profits due to the minimum quality
standard is given by:
Loss ✓<✓L,init =
Z ✓L,init
✓m
(µinit   w✓   k) dG (✓)
= (µinit   k)
Z ✓L
✓m
g (✓) d✓   w
Z ✓L,init
✓m
✓dG (✓)
= (µinit   k)
✓
1 
✓
✓m
✓L,init
◆↵◆
  w ↵
↵  1✓m
 
1 
✓
✓m
✓L,init
◆↵ 1!
= w✓m
"
✓L,init
✓m
  ↵
↵  1 +
1
↵  1
✓
✓m
✓L,init
◆↵ 1#
Second, for firms with quality ✓⇤ < ✓ < ✓H,init, the e↵ect is unambiguously positive:
these firms were not exporting before the introduction of the minimum standard. With the
minimum quality standard, they now enter the export market and export and stay until they
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are hit by the exit shock. The value of their profit stream is positive and the gain is given by:
Gain ✓⇤<✓<✓H,init =
Z ✓H,init
✓⇤
 1X
t=0
 t
⇣
⇢ (t) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (t))
⇣
↵
↵ 1✓
⇤
⌘
  w✓   k
⌘!
g (✓) d✓
= 11  
Z ✓H,init
✓⇤
⇣
(A⇢   w) ✓ + (1 A⇢)
⇣
↵
↵ 1✓
⇤
⌘
  k
⌘
g (✓) d✓
= 11  

 
⇣
k   (1 A⇢) ↵↵ 1✓⇤
⌘⇣ 
✓m
✓⇤
 ↵   ⇣ ✓m✓H,init⌘↵⌘+ ↵(A⇢ w)↵ 1 ✓m✓  ✓m✓⇤  ↵ 1   ⇣ ✓m✓H,init⌘↵ 1◆ 
= ✓m(1  )(↵ 1)

(1  w)   ✓m✓⇤  ↵ 1   ↵✓H,init   k↵ + (1 A⇢) (✓⇤   µinit)  ⇣ ✓m✓H,init⌘↵ 1 
= 1(1  )(↵ 1)
h
k
 
✓m
✓⇤
 ↵   (k + ↵ (1 A⇢) (✓⇤   µinit))⇣ ✓m✓H,init⌘↵i
Third, for firms with quality ✓ > ✓H,init, the e↵ect is also unambiguously positive: these
firms receive extra profits brought by a higher reputation (from µinit to
↵
↵ 1✓
⇤). For a given
reputation µ, the aggregate profit of firms with quality ✓ > ✓H is given by:Z 1
✓H
 1X
t=0
 t (⇢ (t) ✓ + (1  ⇢ (t))µ  w✓   k)
!
g (✓) d✓
= 11  
Z 1
✓H
((A⇢   w) ✓ + (1 A⇢)µ  k) g (✓) d✓
= 11  

  (k   (1 A⇢)µ)
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵
+ ↵(A⇢ w)↵ 1 ✓m
⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵ 1 
= 11  
h
 k + (1 A⇢)µ+ ↵(A⇢ w)↵ 1 ✓H
i ⇣
✓m
✓H
⌘↵
Hence the gain from the higher reputation is given by:
Gain ✓>✓H,init =
⇣
↵
↵ 1✓
⇤   µinit
⌘
(1 A⇢)
⇣
✓m
✓H,init
⌘↵
Overall, the total welfare e↵ect of a minimum quality standard is:
⇣
↵
↵ 1✓
⇤   µinit
⌘
(1 A⇢)
⇣
✓m
✓H,init
⌘↵
+ 1(1  )(↵ 1)
h
k
 
✓m
✓⇤
 ↵   (k + ↵ (1 A⇢) (✓⇤   µinit))⇣ ✓m✓H,init⌘↵i
  w✓m
"
✓L,init
✓m
  ↵
↵  1 +
1
↵  1
✓
✓m
✓L,init
◆↵ 1#
From simple computations (derivatives of the lost profits terms Loss ✓<✓L,init with respect
to various parameters), we obtain that the lower ↵ (the shape parameter of the distribution),
the lower the loss from the minimum quality standard. Intuitively, a low ↵ means that there
are more firms at the right tail of the distribution, and so relatively less firms that lose from
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the standard. The lost profits due to the minimum quality standard also decrease with the
costs (w and k) (remember that ✓Linit =
µinit k
w ). On the contrary, they increase with the
initial reputation (before the standard); the higher the reputation, the higher the profits the
fly-by-night firms were able to extract when they exported for one period.
A.7 Proof of Result 1
In a LQE, the set of continuing firms is [✓H ,1) from the second period onwards, so the average
price plqet,t+s of cohort t at time t+ s is given by:
plqet,t+s
 
✓
 
=
8<: ✓ if s = 1✓ + ⇢ (s)⇣ ↵↵ 1✓H   ✓⌘ if s > 1
As ✓ < ✓H in a LQE and ⇢ (s) increases in s, it immediately follows that p
lqe
t,t+s increases with
s.
In a HQE, the set of active firms of cohort t at time t+ s is [✓s 1,1), and their average
price is:
phqet,t+s
 
✓
 
=
8<: ✓ if s = 1✓ + ⇢ (s)⇣ ↵↵ 1✓s 1   ✓⌘ if s > 1
⇢ (s) and ✓s 1 increase with s. Immediately following the entry of cohort t, phqet,t+s may fall
with s if the distribution of ✓ has low variance (↵ high), such that ↵↵ 1✓1 > µ. In this case,
there is initially a large mass of firms at the bottom of the distribution of continuing firms
and their prices are falling. However, since µ < ↵↵ 1✓
⇤, there is some finite s0 such that for all
s   s0, phqet,t+s+1
 
✓
 
> phqet,t+s
 
✓
 
and thus at each given point in time, the average unit price is
higher for older cohorts of firms.
A.8 Proof of Result 2
The first part establishes that across cohorts, the fraction of active firms that exit per period
is higher for lower quality firms. In a LQE, the hazard rate is 1 for firms below ✓L and 1   
for firms above ✓H . In a HQE, the hazard rate is
1  
1  T for firms between ✓T 1 and ✓T for all
T , which is decreasing in T , and 1    for firms above ✓⇤.
The second part states that the probability of exit, across quality levels, decreases with
the age of a cohort. In a LQE, the hazard rate of cohort t at time t+ s is
hlqet,t+s =
(
1    +   G(✓L)G(✓L)+1 G(✓H) if s = 1
1    if s > 1
It falls from t + 1 to t + 2 and remains constant thereafter. In a HQE, the hazard rate of
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cohort t at t+ s is
hhqet,t+s = 1    +  
G (✓s) G (✓s 1)
1 G (✓s 1) = 1    +  
✓
1 
✓
✓s 1
✓s
◆↵◆
Since ✓s 1✓s is decreasing in s, h
hqe
t,t+s falls over time.
B Informed and Uninformed Buyers
Suppose the population of importers is divided into N equal-sized groups. There is perfect
information di↵usion within groups but no information di↵usion across groups. Thus, if any
individual in group n has previously consumed the output of firm j, then all buyers in group
n are informed about good j. When firm j is matched with buyer i, i 2 Informed if there
exists i0 2 n such that i0 has been matched with j in the past, and i 2 Uninformed if there
is no i0 2 n such that i0 has been matched with j in the past. Further assume that the firm
observes in any period whether its buyer is informed or not, but not which group the buyer
belongs to; hence it does not know the exact proportion of informed buyers in any period but
only its expectation.
It follows immediately from this setup that ⇢ (0) = 0. After the firm has exported for one
period, one group is informed, so ⇢ (1) = 1N . For each subsequent period, if the fraction of
informed buyers after s export periods is ⇢ (s), then with probability ⇢ (s), the firm is matched
with a buyer in an informed group, and the proportion of informed importers stays at ⇢ (s) for
the next period. With probability 1 ⇢ (s), the firm is matched with a buyer in an uniformed
group; then the fraction of informed importers next period is ⇢ (s) + 1N .
Therefore, the expected fraction of informed buyers is given by the following path: for
s   0,
⇢ (0) = 0
⇢ (s+ 1) = ⇢ (s)2 + (1  ⇢ (s))
✓
⇢ (s) +
1
N
◆
= ⇢ (s)
✓
N   1
N
◆
+
1
N
We can check that this function satisfies Assumption 1.
⇢ (s+ 1)  ⇢ (s) = 1
N
(1  ⇢ (s)) > 0
⇢ (s+ 1)  ⇢ (s)
⇢ (s)
=
1
N
✓
1
⇢ (s)
  1
◆
is decreasing in s
lim
s!1 ⇢ (s) =
1
N
✓
1  N   1
N
◆ 1
= 1
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So ⇢ (s) is increasing in s, rises with s at a falling rate, and converges to 1.
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